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Supervisor:  Mary Rose 
 
This dissertation explores public attitudes towards criminal punishment in 
Western societies and seeks to explain why some individuals are more punitive than 
others. A model of punitiveness with several domains of focus for explaining variation in 
punitiveness including objective risk of crime, conservative climate, and population 
diversity at the country level and demographics, conservative worldview and perceptions 
of crime, law and order at the individual level is tested with data on punitiveness from 
two multinational surveys using hierarchical logistic regression techniques. Analyses 
reveal that males, married individuals, and those who are concerned about crime are more 
punitive. The rest of the findings are specific to the way punitiveness is measured. 
Individuals younger than age 45, individuals who perceive the police as ineffective and 
individuals who have been victims of violent crime tend to prefer incarceration for a 
recidivist burglar. Those who believe in a personal God are more supportive of the death 
penalty while individuals with higher levels of religiosity are less in favor of the death 
penalty. 
Further, individuals who live in societies with more religious heterogeneity and 
where public belief in a literal hell is more prominent are most likely prefer a prison 
sentence for a recidivist burglar and individuals who live in countries with higher levels 
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of lethal violence are more in favor of the death penalty. Religious heterogeneity and 
public belief in hell account for 42% of the variation across Western societies in 
preference for prison for a repeat burglar while homicide rate accounts for over 75% of 
the variation in support for capital punishment across Western societies. Conservative 
religious belief at the contextual level appears to be positively related to support for 
capital punishment indirectly through the homicide rate suggesting that support for the 
death penalty may be influenced by the normality of lethal violence in society dependent 
in part on contextual levels of conservative religious belief. 
This dissertation enhances the understanding of punitiveness by providing the 
most comprehensive multi-level study of public punitiveness to date and proves that 
religious factors, both personal and contextual, are central to understanding variation in 
attitudes toward punishment. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
On July 22, 2011 Anders Behring Breivik killed nearly seventy people in Norway. 
First, a bomb planted by Breivik exploded in the government district of Oslo killing and 
injuring several people. Second, Breivik shot and killed dozens of Norwegians 
participating in a Labor Party youth camp, and wounded many others. Initially, the media 
assumed these killings to be the work of Islamic terrorists and it was shocking to many 
that Breivik, an ordinary-seeming Norwegian, was responsible. In current practice the 
most severe criminal punishment in Norway is 21 years in prison. To some Norwegians 
this will be considered an appropriate punishment. A journalist local to Oslo remarked 
“…in Scandinavian countries it’s deeply ingrained that criminals should have a second 
chance in society.” Another Norwegian, Trond Bentestuen hopes that the official 
response to Breivik will be “more democracy, more tolerance, and more love. People feel 
those are the values Breivik wants to destroy. The most important thing is to make sure 
this lunatic is not able to change our values.”1 
To other Norwegians, 21 years in prison is too lenient a punishment for Breivik. 
Among the blanket of roses placed outside the parliament building in Oslo to 
commemorate the victims killed by Breivik was yellow sign reading “Putting this man 
away for 21 years is not enough. We call on all politicians to make him pay dearly for 
what he has done” and as Breivik and his lawyer entered the courthouse for his initial 
hearing they were met with some angry shouts from the public. Alex Rione, 24, one of 
                                                 
1 Theil, Stefan. July 26, 2011. Norway Shooter Gets Off Easy. The Daily Beast, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/07/26/norway-shooter-breivik-gets-off-easy-maximum-
sentence-is-21-years.html. Last retrieved 9/6/2011 
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the people gathered outside the courthouse said, “I would have liked to see him (Breivik) 
get 21 years per person he has killed.”2 3 
How does the current sociological literature address or explain the current 
situation in Norway where some citizens are satisfied with the current criminal justice 
system while others would prefer a system that metes out a harsher criminal punishment 
for mass homicide? Or more generally, how do sociologists explain divergent attitudes 
toward criminal punishment in Western societies, not just within a single country, but 
also across Western countries? Simply, the sociological literature as it currently stands 
provides little to facilitate our understanding of what influences individual attitudes 
towards criminal punishment within and across Western countries. Therefore, the purpose 
of this dissertation is to examine and explain variation in attitudes towards criminal 
punishment in Western societies. This project will focus not only on how individual or 
personal characteristics influence attitudes toward criminal punishment in Western 
societies but will also consider the national social context as an influence on these 
attitudes. 
Despite the short coming of the current sociological literature in providing 
significant insight as to why attitudes toward criminal punishment differ in Western 
societies there does exist a sizable amount sociological and criminological literature 
dedicated to attitudes towards criminal punishment under the realm of punitiveness. 
Punitiveness is a popular though rarely defined or theorized concept in the criminological 
literature [(Matthews 2005); see Unnever and Cullen 2009 for a clear exception)] and 
                                                 
2 Paterson, Tony, and Jerome Taylor. July 28, 2011. What turned Anders Breivik into Norway's worst 
nightmare? The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/what-turned-anders-
breivik-into-norways-worst-nightmare-2327214.html. Last retrieved 9/6/2011 
3 Kremer, Josiane, Marianne Stigset, and Stephen Treloar. July 25, 2011. Norway Shooting Suspect Breivik 
is Orders into Isolation for Four Weeks. Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-
24/norway-killing-suspect-may-explain-motives.html. Last retrieved 9/6/2011. 
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therefore can refer to a wide variety of research including studies investigating individual 
and public support for severe criminal justice policies such as capital punishment and 
three strikes laws; the type and severity of criminal punishments individuals prefer for 
particular crimes; public satisfaction with the courts and evaluations of the courts (are 
they too harsh or too lenient?); public justifications for criminal punishment (what is the 
purpose of criminal punishment?); and, more generally, the punitive turn in criminal 
justice policy seen in several Western countries in the past few decades. Perhaps the 
common failure to define and theorize punitiveness in prior research is due to its inherent 
importance. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this dissertation punitiveness is simply 
defined as how harshly individuals want to punish criminal offenders. 
Public punitiveness, or how harshly people want to punish criminal offenders, is 
important to understand because it reflects a value that is indicative of culture. Several 
classical figures have noted that the way a society punishes its criminals is a telling 
indicator of a society’s culture. According to Durkheim (1984) [1893]), law and criminal 
punishment are reflective of collective sentiments and therefore provide insights into a 
society’s morality. Similarly, distinguished sociologist Kai Erikson (1966) argues in 
Wayward Puritans that the way a community treats its deviants or criminals is indicative 
of its moral boundaries and identifies those who are valued community members and 
those who are excluded from the community. Moreover, Winston Churchill 
acknowledged that public attitudes toward criminal punishment are a reflection of a 
society’s culture. While Home Secretary, Churchill remarked that “the mood and temper 
of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the unfailing tests 
of the civilization of any country”4 
                                                 
4 It is significant that Churchill referred to the public in his remarks. While criminal justice policy may 
provide a sense of the public’s wishes in terms of criminal punishment, these policies do not always reflect 
public preferences. For instance, in many Western European countries the majority of the public still 
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It is significant that Churchill referred to the public in his remarks. While criminal 
justice policy may provide a sense of the public’s wishes in terms of criminal 
punishment, these policies do not always reflect public preferences. For instance, in many 
Western European countries the majority of the public still favored the use of the death 
penalty at the time of its abolition (Zimring 2003; Zimring and Hawkins 1986). 
Therefore, the best way to understand public punitiveness is to study it directly with data 
collected from individuals. 
Despite the importance of understanding attitudes toward criminal punishment 
and the significant attention punitiveness receives in the extant literature there are still 
many unknowns about the nature of punitiveness in Western societies. What is known 
about punitiveness is greatly limited in scope. The vast majority of research on 
punitiveness is based on data from the United States, a country that is exceptional in the 
realm of crime and punishment relative to other Western nations.5 The U.S. is the only 
Western country with the death penalty and its incarceration rate, currently at 732 per 
100,000 population, is 3 to 12 times higher than the mainland incarceration rates of other 
Western nations. Further, in many jurisdictions within the U.S., juveniles who commit 
serious criminal offenses are commonly tried in adult court, a practice that is unthinkable 
in most Western countries (Deitch et al. 2009). Due to these extremes, one cannot assume 
that the current accumulated knowledge dealing with punitiveness applies to any Western 
countries outside of the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
favored the use of the death penalty at the time of its abolition (Zimring 2003; Zimring and Hawkins 1986). 
Therefore, the best way to understand public punitiveness is to study it directly with data collected from 
individuals. 
5 See the International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief. Available at:  
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate 
Last retrieved 9/12/2011. 
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Further, most research on U.S. attitudes toward criminal punishment is not based 
on nationally representative samples and only examines punitive attitudes at the 
individual level. Other methodological challenges of this research include small sample 
sizes and considerable variation across studies in the way punitiveness and the potential 
correlates of punitiveness are operationalized. As a likely result of these methodological 
difficulties, the research on punitiveness is plagued with mixed findings as to which 
individual-level factors are significantly related to punitiveness. Due to the dominance of 
individual-level studies of punitiveness in the extant literature, there is minimal focus on 
how the social context may influence individual attitudes toward punishment. The few 
U.S.-based empirical studies that do consider the relationship between social context and 
attitudes toward punishment suggest that social context at the neighborhood and national-
level can cultivate punitive attitudes (Rankin 1979; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 
2003; Beckett 1997). 
Based on the above, several gaps in the punitiveness literature can be identified. 
First, not much is known about individual attitudes toward criminal punishment in 
Western societies beyond the United States underscoring the need for more comparative 
research on punitiveness. The current dearth of comparative research on punitiveness in 
Western societies, or how harshly individuals want to punish criminal offenders, is 
surprising since the comparative approach is quite popular in the study of criminal justice 
policy across Western societies. There exists in the recent criminological literature a keen 
theoretical and empirical interest in (1) explaining variation in penal policy among 
Western nations (Jacobs and Kleban 2003; Lappi-Seppala 2008; Sutton 2000, 2004; 
Tonry 2001, 2007; Young and Brown 1993) (2) providing explanations for why the U.S. 
and/or England are, in recent times, more punitive in their penal policies than other 
Western countries, (Garland 2001; Savelsberg 1994; Tonry 1999; Whitman 2003) and 
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giving country-specific or Anglophone-country accounts of the rise in punitive penal 
policies experienced in recent decades (Beckett and Sasson 2000; Roberts et al. 2003; 
Tonry 1999, 2004). 
Most of this work gives public opinion or public attitudes toward punishment a 
fair amount of attention. Public punitiveness is incorporated into explanations of Western 
criminal justice policy in various ways. Public punitiveness is either considered as a 
direct (Lappi-Seppala 2008) or an indirect influence on criminal justice policy, to the 
extent that public opinion is taken into account during policy making (Jacobs and Kleban 
2003; Savelsberg 1994). Public punitiveness is also thought of as a direct and indirect 
influence on criminal justice policy, as perceived correctly or incorrectly by policy 
makers (Roberts et al. 2003; Tonry 1999, 2004). By contrast, Garland (2001) does not 
differentiate between public punitiveness and criminal justice policy treating them as the 
same from an empirical standpoint and thus provides the same explanation for both. The 
significant role that public punitiveness has in many explanations of variation in Western 
penal policies suggests that a better understanding of the influences on public 
punitiveness will be a welcome addition to the literature as it will provide a more 
thorough understanding of the determinants of criminal justice policy. 
Second, due to the current deficiency in comparative research focusing on 
Western attitudes toward criminal punishment, the national social context has yet to be 
adequately considered as influential in determining how harshly individuals want to 
punish criminal offenders. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a more thorough 
understanding of public punitiveness in Western societies by addressing these clear gaps 
in the literature. The focus is limited to Western societies because any significant 
differences in attitudes towards punishment found between people from different 
countries that share the same foundational roots, in this case Greco-Roman civilization 
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and Christianity, and historical-cultural influences such as the Renaissance, The 
Protestant Reformation, The Enlightenment, and colonialism are more perplexing. Also, a 
study of punitiveness in the Western world is much more feasible than a world-wide 
study of punitiveness. At any rate, in order to expand our understanding of punitiveness 
beyond the U.S. and to begin to understand cross-national differences in public 
punitiveness, the Western world is a good place to start. 
As follows, this dissertation includes a cross-national and multi-level study of 
punitiveness in Western societies. The primary data in this study consist of two 
multinational datasets each containing individual-level data on punitiveness. Each dataset 
has a unique measure of punitiveness. One dataset provides information on punishment 
preferences for a recidivist burglar while the other supplies information on attitudes 
toward the death penalty. First, these data are analyzed to more fully understand 
individual-level influences on punitiveness. What influences attitudes toward criminal 
punishment at the individual level?  Do the same influences apply to all Western 
societies? Next, country-level data gathered from a variety of sources are incorporated 
into the analyses in order to explore the influences of social context on attitudes toward 
punishment and address the following research questions. What aspects of the national 
social context influence individual attitudes toward punishment? Are they the same 
aspects predicted by U.S-based research? How much do aspects of the social context at 
the national level explain variation in public punitiveness across countries? 
In this study, a special focus in placed on the influence of religiosity on 
punitiveness at both the individual and contextual level. Since punitiveness is a value it 
makes sense to consider the role of religion in the development of punitive attitudes 
toward criminal punishment. How does religiosity at the individual-level influence 
punitive attitudes and are these individual-level influences consistent across Western 
 8 
societies? What role does the religious social context play in shaping individual attitudes 
toward criminal punishment? How much does the religious social context at the national 
level account for any variation across Western countries in public punitiveness? 
This research will provide a better understanding of attitudes toward criminal 
punishment so that variations in these attitudes among individuals within the same 
country or tendencies for individuals in some countries to be more or less punitive than 
individuals in other countries will be less of an enigma. Indeed, the findings from this 
study will facilitate a better understanding of the variation in Norwegian and international 
attitudes toward the appropriate punishment for Andres Breivik (is 21 years in prison 
enough?) that are sure to receive more media attention once his trial is underway. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
previous literature on punitiveness for the specific purpose of identifying a multi-level 
theory or model of punitiveness that applies across Western societies. Chapter 3 describes 
the two multi-national datasets utilized in this study and provides a detailed account of 
the study design and methods employed to more fully understand punitiveness across 
Western societies. Chapter 4 describes the variation across Western societies in public 
punitiveness evident from both data sources and provides a test of the individual-level 
hypotheses from the multi-level model of punitiveness developed in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6 both report the results of a full test of the multi-level model of punitiveness 
with each chapter using a different dataset. These tests include evaluations of the country-
level hypotheses corresponding to the multi-level model of punitiveness developed in 







Chapter 2:  Literature Review and Hypotheses 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the sociological and criminological 
literature in order to identify important components of punitiveness and develop a model 
to predict punitiveness that can be applied across Western societies. As mentioned in the 
introduction the extant literature on attitudes toward criminal punishment is largely 
atheoretical. Definitions of punitiveness and theories of punitiveness are hard to come by. 
One exception is Unnever and Cullen (2009: 284) who provide a middle-range theory of 
individual differences in punitiveness defined as “public support for crime control 
policies that increase the level of punishment for individual offenders.” This definition 
varies from the one used for this study but it is sufficiently similar thereby enabling this 
theory to inform the current research. To be clear, for the purposes of this study, 
punitiveness is conceptualized as a judgment regarding the desired severity of 
punishment—that is, how harshly people want to punish criminal offenders. This may be 
expressed through support of a particular policy pertaining to punitiveness, for example, 
the death penalty. However, punitiveness may also be expressed through something less 
formal than policy. This more inclusive conceptualization of punitiveness is more 
appropriate for cross-national research given the range of policy environments across 
different countries. 
A study examining attitudes across multiple countries needs to consider both 
individual and country-level factors that may shape punitiveness. This chapter reviews 
evidence for the types of variables that should be in a multi-level model. The review 
begins with existing theory and results regarding individual-level factors and then moves 
to a discussion of what country-level factors should also inform a model of punitiveness. 
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Before continuing the literature review on attitudes toward punishment, it is worth 
reiterating some of the limitations of the research that informs this model. First, the vast 
majority of this literature is based in U.S. What is known about punitiveness in the 
United States may not apply to other Western societies or Western society as a whole. A 
good illustration of this is race. In the U.S. race tends to have a significant influence on 
attitudes toward criminal punishment. Blacks are often found to be less supportive of the 
death penalty than whites (Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 
2006; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007). A straightforward divide is not as apparent for 
other attitudes toward punishment. Blacks tend to be more punitive if they fear crime or if 
crime is a salient concern (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 1991; 
Johnson 2006). Also, Blacks who perceive racial bias in the criminal justice system are 
found to be less supportive of punitive criminal justice policies (Johnson 2006). Other the 
other hand, whites who hold prejudiced views toward blacks tend to be more punitive 
(Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and 
Fischer 2007; Barkan and Cohn 1994). A further complexity of these findings is that 
racial differences in punitiveness can be crime specific (Rossi, Simpson, and Miller 
1985). 
Notably, however, any black and white differences in punitiveness are not evident 
outside of the U.S. For instance, research conducted in Britain does not find differences 
in punitiveness between blacks and whites (King and Maruna 2009; Wood and Viki 
2004). In addition, likely because race has different meanings and implications outside of 
the United States, international survey data commonly lack information on race. Thus 
although a model examining U.S. attitudes should surely include race, and although 
comparative data on race and attitudes in other Western countries would be desirable, 
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race will not be included in the current models predicting punitiveness across Western 
societies. 
Second, it is noteworthy that many of the research findings on correlates of 
punitiveness are mixed. For each correlate of punitiveness discussed below there will be 
some studies with null or opposite findings. This may be due at least in part to great 
variation in the methodology within the attitudes toward punishment literature. Many 
research studies pertaining to punitiveness utilize data from limited jurisdictions, such as 
a single city (McCorkle 1993; Wanner and Caputo 1987; Tygart 1996) or a particular 
region (Maruna and King 2009). A few of these studies suffer from very small samples of 
200 respondents or less (Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Tyler and Weber 1982). Also the 
operationalization of the dependent variable, punitiveness, and the independent variables 
(e.g. fear of crime) expected to predict punitiveness tend to vary widely across studies. 
Thus, for simplicity’s sake the following review relays common (albeit not always 
universal) findings on various factors and considers variables that both theory (Unnever 
and Cullen 2009) and tradition suggest for inclusion. In this review individual-level 
factors are considered first. The relationship between demographics and punitiveness, 
personal experiences and punitiveness and social beliefs and punitiveness are explored. A 
subsequent section considers country-level factors that may influence punitiveness. 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CORRELATES OF PUNITIVENESS 
Unnever and Cullen (2009) are the first to propose an individual-level theory of 
punitiveness, and this model offers an excellent way to begin to make sense of the 
accumulated literature on the correlates of punitiveness. The crux of Unnever and 
Cullen’s (2009) theory is that individual-level differences in punitiveness are due to 
whether people can empathize with criminal offenders. They argue that Americans can 
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empathetically identify with criminal offenders by recognizing any distress that may 
contribute to their criminal behavior and/or by imagining and feeling the pain the 
offender may experience if punished harshly. More empathetic people are less likely to 
support punitive criminal justice policies. On the other hand, those who are unable to “put 
themselves in the offender’s shoes” are more likely to favor harsher criminal punishments 
(Unnever and Cullen 2009: 286-287). This is simple enough. The complexities of the 
theory lie in the factors that contribute to an individual’s ability to empathetically identify 
with criminal offenders and the fact that empathy is not a static trait. 
Specifically, Unnever and Cullen (2009) argue that personal experiences, 
structural location, group identity and genetic predisposition directly influence 
empathetic identification. They also indirectly influence empathetic identification by 
shaping the constructed images of offenders by type of crime and forming social beliefs 
including racism, religious beliefs and political beliefs. The media and political elites are 
considered to have great influence on how individuals construct images of offenders. 
Moreover, constructed images of offenders, social beliefs and empathetic identification 
have bi-directional influences one another other (Unnever and Cullen 2009: 297) where 
social beliefs shape the ability to empathetically identify with offenders while the ability 
to empathetically identify with offenders simultaneously shapes social beliefs. Another 
key aspect of the theory is that empathy is not stable within individuals. Some individuals 
may empathetically identify with constructed images of offenders for particular crimes 
but not others. 
Unnever and Cullen (2009) do a service to literature on punitiveness by proposing 
a provocative theory of punitiveness. Their theory underscores the importance of personal 
characteristics, experiences and beliefs in shaping individual levels of punitiveness, and 
they highlight the role that the media and elites can play in shaping attitudes toward 
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criminal punishment. Unnever and Cullen (2009) also recognize the need to explain 
differences in punitiveness across societies and conjecture that country-level differences 
in punitiveness lie in the ability of citizens to individualize offenders. They propose that 
those societies where criminals are conceptualized more as an “other” or where there is a 
strong “us” versus “them” mentality between criminals and law-abiding citizens are 
likely to be more punitive (Unnever and Cullen 2009: 301). 
However, their theory is not particularly useful to inform a model of punitiveness 
to be applied across Western societies. From a practical standpoint, international, or even 
national, measures of empathetic identification with offenders by crime type would be 
difficult to develop. Therefore, a direct test of this theory would be very challenging. 
Some studies have explored the relationship between empathy as a trait and attitudes 
toward the death penalty (Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2005). These studies use scales or 
variations of scales such as the Davis Empathy Scale (Davis 1996) that contain items 
such as “Sometimes I don’t feel sorry for other people when they are having problems” 
and “I often have tender and concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.” This 
is one way to get at empathy and this scale, or other scales designed to capture empathy 
as a trait, could be added to an international survey that also contains data on punitiveness 
but empathy as a trait is not the same as empathetic identification with a particular type of 
offender. Nevertheless, information on empathy as a trait is not included in available 
international data that also include information on attitudes toward criminal punishment. 
Further, Unnever and Cullen (2009) treat individual punitiveness as situation and 
country-specific. They argue that punitiveness depends on crime type and the way 
various criminal offenders are portrayed in the media and the wider social environment 
(Unnever and Cullen: 291). This makes survey measures of empathetic identification 
more complicated where scales designed to gauge empathy as a trait will not suffice. It 
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seems that several survey questions would need to be developed in order capture 
empathetic identification and how it varies by crime type. Identifying crime types of 
interest may be difficult in an international context since the images of a stereotypical 
offender for a certain crime as well as the salience of certain crimes may vary across 
nations. Also, somehow, country-level differences in media portrayal of criminals and the 
social environment would need to be accounted for in cross-national measures of 
empathetic identification. It is not readily apparent how this can be done. Due to these 
challenges and in order to successfully study cross-national differences in punitiveness, 
variables need to be conceptualized more broadly in a way that will allow standardized 
measurement and meaningful comparisons across countries. 
Drawing on the features of Unnever and Cullen’s (2009) model that are promising 
for a cross-national analysis of punitiveness in Western societies, this study focuses on 
the individual-level factors they cite. Differences in empathy, and therefore in 
punitiveness are likely influenced by personal characteristics, experiences and social 
beliefs. Therefore, the individual-level literature on attitudes toward punishment is 
reviewed below to identify the demographic, experiential and belief factors that should be 
incorporated in model of punitiveness that can be applied across Western societies. Three 
groupings of variables are identified for inclusion in a model of punitiveness to be 
applied across Western societies: demographics, conservative worldview and perceptions 
of crime, law and order. Figure 1 provides a conceptual diagram of the types of 
individual-level factors that should be included in a cross-national model of punitiveness. 
The following review specifically identifies which demographics, perceptions of crime, 
law, and order and indicators of a conservative worldview that should be incorporated 
into a model of punitiveness that can be applied across Western societies. 
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Researchers always consider the role of demographics in their empirical work on 
attitudes toward punishment. Apart from race (discussed above), common considerations 
include gender, education, age, income and marital status. These are often treated as 
control variables rather than serving as the main topic of interest. Even still, some 
common trends are apparent. The most common demographics to show a significant 
relationship to punitiveness are gender and education. 
Women are more often than not found to be less punitive than men (Arthur 1993; 
Miller, Rossi, and Simpson 1991; Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 1991; Unnever, Cullen, 
and Fischer 2007; Kelley and Braithwaite 1990; Hough, Lewis, and Walker 1988; 
Langworthy and Whitehead 1986; Makela 1966). This is especially the case for attitudes 
toward the death penalty and the treatment of juvenile offenders. Women tend to be less 
in favor of the death penalty (Kelley and Braithwaite 1990; Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 
2003; Applegate et al. 2000; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Jacoby and Cullen 
1998; Cochran and Chamlin 2006) and less supportive of punishing of juvenile offenders 
severely (Grasmick and McGill 1994; Sprott 1999; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1993; 
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women may be less punitive than men due to a greater concern for the well-being of 
others, and due to an ethic of care and compassion; by contrast, men may be guided by a 
strong ethic of justice (Applegate, Cullen, and Fisher 2002). In Unnever and Cullen’s 
(2009) terms, the compassionate nature of women may make it easier to empathetically 
identify with criminals thus leading to preferences for more lenient punishments for 
criminal offenders. Psychological research does suggest that women report more empathy 
than men (Eisenberg and Lennon 1983). This may be due to differences in genetic 
predispositions, biology, or group identity, all factors considered in Unnever and Cullen’s 
(2009) theory but without much explanation. Nevertheless, the literature indicates that 
gender is an important factor to include in a model of punitiveness. 
Previous research on attitudes toward punishment indicates that there is a negative 
relationship between education and punitiveness in that those who are more educated are 
less punitive in their attitudes toward criminal punishment (Applegate et al. 2000; 
Costelloe et al. 2002; Dowler 2003; Grasmick et al. 1993; Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 
2003; Kelley and Braithwaite 1990; Maruna and King 2009; Payne et al. 2004; Thomas, 
Cage, and Foster 1976; Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007). 
Again, little theoretical explanation is available since education is usually used as a 
control variable in analyses involving punitiveness. From an empathy perspective 
education may expose people to more information on situational influences external to 
the criminal offender that may shape criminal behavior. That is, as education increases 
perhaps one is more likely to see how criminal behavior could be influenced by the social 
environment rather than primarily being due to the disposition of the offender. There is 
research to suggest that people who attribute criminal behavior to rational choice and 
personal disposition are more supportive of the death penalty and harsher punishments 
for criminals than those who perceive social factors such as poverty and other social ills 
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to be key causes of crime (Cullen et al. 1985; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003). As 
Unnever and Cullen (2009) argue, this ability to imagine societal influences on criminal 
behavior could lead to empathetic identification with criminal offenders and thus lower 
levels of punitiveness. 
Age is sometimes found to significantly influence attitudes toward criminal 
punishment though findings are mixed. Some studies find that older individuals are more 
punitive than younger individuals (Unnever and Cullen 2007; Hessing, Keijser, and 
Elffers 2003). Some scholars suggest that as people age the more likely they are to have 
experienced a criminal victimization or know someone who has (Hough, Lewis, and 
Walker 1988). (The relationship between criminal victimization and punitiveness and 
fear of crime and punitiveness will be reviewed in the next section on perceptions of 
crime, law and order). However, at times the relationship between age and punitiveness is 
crime specific where older individuals are more punitive for some crimes but not others 
(Kuhn 2002; McCorkle 1993). There are also a couple of studies that find younger 
individuals to be more punitive (Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1993; Tyler and Boeckmann 
1997). Clearly, age is an important factor to include in a cross-national model of 
punitiveness but the direction of the relationship is not straightforward. The consideration 
of empathy does not clarify the direction of this relationship as research on the 
relationship between age and empathy is lacking. 
A few studies on punitiveness find income is positively related to punitiveness. 
Those with higher incomes are more in favor of the death penalty (Baumer, Messner, and 
Rosenfeld 2003; Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007), harsher 
courts (Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006) and 
harsher criminal punishments in general (Maruna and King 2009). This may be due to the 
fact that people with higher incomes may perceive themselves to be at a higher risk of 
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criminal victimization because they are more likely to have valuable items for criminal 
offenders to steal. More affluent individuals may also have difficulty empathetically 
identifying with some criminal offenders due to being unfamiliar with what it is like to 
lack financial resources and social capital, a reality that many criminal offenders are sure 
to suffer. In a related way, in a later section, research supporting the “threat perspective” 
is reviewed which suggests that dominant groups are more punitive when their 
dominancy and privilege are threatened by minority groups. Quite possibly, net of 
education, those with higher incomes may view criminal behavior as more of a threat to 
their ability to maintain high status in society. Also, high income could reduce empathy 
for criminals by isolating people (through residential segregation and/or social networks) 
from contacts with people who commit crimes or come under the scrutiny of the criminal 
justice system; such contacts may offer some more ways to empathize with a particular 
offender accused of crime. This possibility is rarely addressed in the literature. One study 
does consider the relationship between knowing people who have had direct contact with 
the criminal justice system and punitiveness. However, the study finds no significant 
relationship between either knowing an arrestee, knowing someone harassed by the 
police or having visited someone in jail and a conservative criminal justice ideology that 
is consistent with wanting to punish criminals more harshly (Browning and Cao 1992). 
Finally, several studies indicate that those who are married are more punitive 
(Arthur 1993; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Costelloe et al. 2002; Dowler 
2003; Kelley and Braithwaite 1990). Again, greater social ties (through marriage) may 
generate more threat and concern about what can be lost. That is, married individuals 
may fear that a child or spouse will fall victim to crime and thus may feel they have more 
to lose at the hands of crime. This may generate a form of altruistic fear (Warr and 
Ellison 2000), which could increase identification with and empathy toward a crime 
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victim rather than an offender. Further, altruistic fear may account for the finding in some 
studies that older individuals are more punitive than younger individuals. As people age 
they are more likely to have children, have a greater number of children, and even have 
grandchildren. Fear of criminal victimization for children and grandchildren may make it 
difficult to empathetically identify with some criminal offenders. Altruistic fear may also 
activate concerns about risk of crime. The relationships between fear of crime and 
punitiveness and perceived risk of crime and punitiveness are further addressed in the 
next section on the relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and attitudes 
toward punishment. 
Based on the above review of research on the relationship between demographics 
and punitiveness, it is expected that those living in Western societies who are male, 
married and have higher incomes will be more punitive while those with higher levels of 
education will be less punitive. Age is tentatively expected to be positively related to 
punitiveness due to the likely development of altruistic fear as individuals’ families 
expand with age. Next is a review of the literature on the relationship between 
perceptions of crime, law, and order and punitiveness. 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order 
Demographics are not the only individual-level factors that may shape 
punitiveness. A person’s perceptions of crime, law, and order may also influence levels 
of preferred criminal punishment. Specifically, fear of criminal victimization, perceived 
risk of criminal victimization and perceptions of the police may all influence attitudes 
toward punishment. Fear of crime and beliefs about the risk of criminal victimization 
may influence attitudes toward punishment in that those who fear crime or believe their 
risk of victimization is significant will support harsher criminal punishments in order to 
 20 
prevent future crime from occurring. In a related way, negative evaluations of police 
performance could indicate a deep concern with crime and a keen interest in the reduction 
of crime. If an individual perceives that the police are ineffective in preventing crime 
they may conclude that criminals need to be locked-up in order to prevent themselves and 
others from being victimized. These perceptions of police ineffectiveness may promote 
images of criminal offenders as out-of-control, “wild in the streets” and unable to be 
contained. Incapacitation may be deemed the only way to prevent criminals from 
engaging in crime. People may want the criminals who are caught by the police to be 
punished severely. Beyond these instrumental explanations for punitiveness, those who 
seriously identify themselves as potential victims of crime may find it extremely difficult 
to empathetically identify with offenders and thus prefer harsher criminal justice policies. 
There is considerable evidence that fear of crime, a higher perceived risk of 
criminal victimization and overall worry and concern about crime are associated 
punitiveness or wanting to punish criminals more harshly (Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 
1992; 1993; Browning and Cao 1992; Dowler 2003; Miller, Rossi, and Simpson 1991; 
Arthur 1993; Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 1991; Costelloe et al. 2002; Johnson 2006; 
Hough, Lewis, and Walker 1988; Maruna and King 2009; Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 
2003; Sprott and Doob 1997; Applegate et al. 2000; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; 
Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Flanagan, McGarrell, and Brown 1985). Previous research 
also indicates those who think the police are effective in holding crime down, preventing 
crime and solving crimes have positive perceptions of the courts including the severity of 
punishments meted out (Flanagan, McGarrell, and Brown 1985), and those who believe 
the government is doing a good job fighting crime are less likely to support capital 
punishment (Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 2003). These findings imply that those who do 
 21 
not have positive evaluations of the police may have the opposite response and favor 
harsher punishments for criminals. 
The relationships between perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness 
cannot be fully evaluated without also considering the relationship between actual 
criminal victimization and punitiveness as this is a relationship that has received a 
considerable amount attention in the criminological literature (Baron and Hartnagel 1996; 
Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1993; Applegate et al. 2000; McCorkle 1993; Unnever, 
Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006). A common assumption in the research examining the 
relationship between criminal victimization and attitudes toward criminal punishment is 
that the previously victimized have a higher stake in the reduction of crime and a vested 
interest in avoiding further criminal victimization and thus preventing all of the 
discomforts attached to criminal victimization. Therefore, victims of previous crime may 
prefer harsher punishments for criminal offenders as a manifestation of wanting to reduce 
the likelihood of another criminal victimization either for themselves or others. Criminal 
victimization may also hinder the ability to empathetically identify with criminal 
offenders as they may more easily identify with other victims of crime. 
Contrary to the common expectation that prior criminal victimization leads to 
preferences for harsher criminal punishments, research typically indicates no significant 
relationship between criminal victimization and attitudes toward punishment (McCorkle 
1993; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Maruna and King 2009; Costelloe et al. 
2002; Baron and Hartnagel 1996; Johnson 2006; Cullen et al. 1985; Browning and Cao 
1992; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Applegate et al. 2000; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 
1992). However, this null finding may be due to the way victimization is commonly 
measured. 
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Most measures of criminal victimization in the literature on public attitudes 
toward criminal punishment are very general and do not distinguish between violent and 
non-violent victimization. The survey questions used to operationalize criminal 
victimization usually ask whether the respondent or anyone in the respondent’s 
household has been a victim of crime (Browning and Cao 1992; Costelloe et al. 2002; 
Maruna and King 2009; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Wanner and Caputo 1987; 
Baron and Hartnagel 1996), a victim of property or violent crime (Schwartz, Guo, and 
Kerbs 1992; Johnson 2006), or a victim of a variety of crimes often including both 
violent and non-violent crimes (Applegate et al. 2000; Arthur 1993; Cullen et al. 1985). 
Some measures of criminal victimization do ask about frequency of victimization but still 
do not distinguish between violent and non-violent crimes  (Unnever, Cullen, and 
Bartkowski 2006). 
Previous research has overlooked the possibility that it may only be violent 
criminal victimizations that yield more punitive attitudes toward criminal offenders. After 
all, violent victimization is likely to be more unpleasant, have a stronger emotional 
impact, and be more memorable than non-violent victimization. Empathetic identification 
with offenders who have committed violent crime may be more difficult than offenders 
who commit property or victimless crimes. For instance, it may be easier to imagine 
another’s “need” for financial resources or self-medication in the form of drug use but not 
another’s “need” to cause another person physical pain. Therefore, at the very least 
criminal victimization should be included in a model of punitiveness and efforts should 
be made to measure previous criminal victimization in a more careful way to fully ensure 
a null relationship between victimization and punitiveness or reveal any nuances in the 
relationship between previous criminal victimization and punitiveness. 
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In the current study, the possibility that severity of prior criminal victimization 
may generate punitiveness is considered. Ideally, the influence of vicarious victimization 
of a family member should also be considered as influential on punitiveness independent 
of personal victimization (Warr and Ellison 2000), however survey questions used to 
operationalize prior criminal victimization usually do not ask about vicarious 
victimization nor distinguish between personal and vicarious victimization (e.g. asking 
about victimization that happened to the respondent or anyone in the respondent’s 
household). The survey data used in this study is no exception and therefore the 
relationship between vicarious victimization and punitiveness cannot be directly 
addressed. 
Based on the above review of perceptions of crime, law and order and their 
relationship to attitudes toward criminal punishment it is expected that those living in 
Western societies who fear crime or perceive their risk of victimization to be high and 
perceive the police as ineffective will be more punitive. It is also expected that those in 
Western societies who have experienced violent victimization will be more punitive. 
Next is a review of the literature on the relationship between conservative religious belief 
and punitiveness. 
Conservative Religious Belief 
In addition to certain demographics and perceptions of crime, law, and order, 
conservative religious belief is likely to promote punitiveness. The relationship between 
religion and punitiveness is a relatively recent consideration in the attitudes towards 
punishment literature and several aspects of religion in individuals’ lives are considered 
to contribute to how harshly people what to punish criminal offenders. Previous research 
finds that belonging to a religious denomination and self identification as a religious or 
 24 
spiritual person are negatively associated with support for the death penalty and 
punitiveness in general (Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 2003; Maruna and King 2009). 
Religiosity defined broadly as the importance of religion in day-to-day life sometimes 
reveals itself to be a negative predictor of punitiveness (Grasmick et al. 1993), and at 
other times no significant relationship is found between religiosity and punitiveness 
(Applegate et al. 2000; Unnever and Cullen 2006). 
Previous research also examines the relationship between church attendance and 
punitiveness. Several studies reveal church attendance to be negatively related to support 
for the death penalty. Those who attend church more often are less likely to favor of 
capital punishment (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Stack, Cao, and Adamczyk 
2007; Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007). This may be due to 
the feeling of “community” that more frequent church attendance may generate. Those 
who are part of a church community may be less individualistic and more able to 
consider the needs of others, especially those in their church community. Church 
congregations, through volunteers within the congregation, form committees and 
organize activities to help other congregants and the community in general such as: 
welcoming committees, funeral committee, food drives, child-care, mission trips, etc 
(Chaves 2004). Those who belong to such a community, and those most involved in the 
community, may find it easier to empathetically identify with criminal offenders, 
especially if the offender happens to be part of the same congregation or if they are of the 
same religious denomination. 
The findings presented so far on the relationship between religiosity and 
punitiveness suggest that those who consider themselves more religious and attend 
church more frequently tend to be less punitive but these constructs do nothing to indicate 
the presence of conservative religious belief. Nonetheless, these aspects of religiosity are 
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important to consider as predictors of punitiveness alongside religious belief as controls. 
Catholicism is also an important trait to consider in studies on attitudes toward the death 
penalty since the death penalty is explicitly opposed by the Catholic Church and the 
associated likelihood that the majority Catholics will not support the death penalty. 
In contrast to mainstream Catholics, conservative Protestants hold religiously 
conservative beliefs and this group and its associated beliefs have received significant 
attention in the attitudes toward punishment literature. Popular beliefs among 
conservative protestants that are expected to promote punitiveness include: (1) the bible 
is inerrant—leading to literal interpretations of biblical passages promoting revenge and 
retribution (e.g. “an eye for an eye” Exod 21:24-25); (2) human depravity and sin are 
rampant; and (3) everyone is sinful and needs to repent and accept salvation through 
grace. Survey research uses various measures of these beliefs to identify conservative 
Protestants, especially biblical inerrancy. When events described in the Bible are taken 
literally no attempt is made to interpret scripture relatively and take cultural context into 
account (Bruce 1983). These literal meanings promote retribution, emphasized in Judeo-
Christian teachings (e.g., Exod. 21:12, 14; 15-25; Lev. 25:17-22; Matt 5: 21-22, Num. 
35:30-34) that evil-doers, wrong-doers and criminals should be punished simply because 
they deserve it (Grasmick et al. 1992). Conservative Protestants are expected to be more 
punitive because the beliefs that they strongly adhere to based on a literal understanding 
of the Bible promote retribution and because of the need to be protected from people who 
are inherently evil. Supporting retribution as a justification for punishment is strongly 
related to preferences for harsher criminal punishment and more severe criminal 
punishments such as the death penalty and incarceration (Warr and Stafford 1984) where 
criminals are incapacitated from further harming society through evil and sin. 
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A related argument is that conservative Protestants are more punitive because 
they are more likely to attribute criminal behavior to disposition and not to environmental 
influences (Grasmick et al. 1993; Grasmick and McGill 1994). There is research to show 
that dispositional attributions for criminal behavior are associated with punitiveness 
(Cullen et al. 1985). Considering the popularly held beliefs of conservative Protestants 
they are unlikely to empathetically identify with criminal offenders who in their eyes are 
evil and sinful   While a few studies do show conservative Protestants to be significantly 
more punitive in their attitudes toward the death penalty and punitiveness in general 
(Grasmick et al. 1993; Unnever and Cullen 2006; King and Wheelock 2007) there are 
many studies that indicate a null relationship between religious fundamentalism and 
punitiveness (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; 
Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007; Applegate et al. 2000; Unnever, Cullen, and 
Bartkowski 2006). 
Conceptualizations and images of God are another type of religious belief that 
may shape attitudes toward criminal punishment. Belief in a punitive God, a 
conceptualization that is consistent with conservative protestant views of God as 
vengeful, has been shown to be positively associated with punitiveness while belief in 
forgiveness and a loving God tend to be negatively associated with punitiveness 
(Applegate et al. 2000; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006). Those who believe in a 
loving God may emulate their view of God by feeling more compassion toward criminal 
offenders, thereby making it easier to empathetically identify with offenders and be less 
supportive of more severe criminal justice policies. Following the trends in the literature 
on religiosity and punitiveness reviewed above it is expected that individuals who attend 
church more frequently and have higher levels of religiosity will be less punitive while 
individuals with a more punitive, less loving image of God will be more punitive. 
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Political conservatism, a similar construct to religious conservatism, is another 
likely influence on attitudes toward criminal punishment. Scholars have made similar 
arguments as to why religious conservatism and political conservatism are positively 
related to punitiveness, that is, conservative protestants and the politically conservative 
are more punitive because they attribute criminal behavior to personal disposition and not 
factors in the social environment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Grasmick and McGill 
1994). There is quite a bit of evidence that those who are politically conservative are 
more punitive. Individuals, especially those from the United States, who self-report 
higher levels of political and social conservatism [e.g. they place themselves on the 
higher end of a scale ranging from extremely liberal (1) and extremely conservative (7)] 
tend to be more punitive (Applegate et al. 2000; Baron and Hartnagel 1996; Baumer, 
Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Browning and Cao 1992; 
Costelloe et al. 2002; Maruna and King 2009; Stinchombe et al. 1980; Taylor, Schepple, 
and Stinchcombe 1979; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and 
Fischer 2007). Therefore, individuals living in Western societies are expected to be more 
punitive if they identify as politically conservative. However, conservatism is not 
something commonly included in international data that also contains data on 
punitiveness and therefore it will not be included in the proposed model of punitiveness 
at the individual-level though it will be considered at the contextual level (see section 
below entitled “Conservative Climate”). 
So far the influences of personal characteristics (demographics), personal beliefs 
(perceptions of crime, law and order and religious belief) and experiences (victimization 
and church attendance) are considered as influential on individual attitudes toward 
punishment. Next, the influence of social context on individual attitudes towards 
punishment is explored. As can be gathered from Unnever and Cullen’s (2009) theory of 
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punitiveness, culture may play a role in influencing individual attitudes toward 
punishment through the depiction and discussion of criminal offenders by elites and the 
media. They argue that the way the media and elites brand criminal offenders indirectly 
shapes punitiveness by influencing empathetic identification with offenders. However, 
social context may also directly influence individual attitudes toward punishment. 
It would be hard to believe that punitiveness is not directly shaped by at least 
some aspects of the broader social environment in which individuals are placed. The 
social context can have an effect by shaping individual views of what is “normal”. For 
instance, someone who identifies as politically liberal in a very liberal town may have a 
different idea of what is appropriate than the political liberal living in a more 
conservative area. In fact, Baumer et al. (2003) argue and demonstrate in their study of 
spatial variation in U.S. death penalty attitudes, that a full understanding of punitiveness 
requires the consideration of both individual-level factors and the social environment. 
Controlling for the compositional influences of demographics, conservatism, religious 
fundamentalism and other individual-level factors Baumer et al. (2003) find that the level 
of lethal violence, the size of the black population and the proportion of political 
conservatives at the neighborhood-level significantly influence attitudes toward the death 
penalty. They conclude that “a comprehensive understanding of public opinion on capital 
punishment requires information about both the characteristics of individuals and the 
social environment in which they live” (Baumer et al. 2003: 867-868). Thus, the next 
section considers the influence of social context on attitudes toward criminal punishment 
and identifies country-level factors that should be included in a model that explains 
attitudes toward punishment across Western societies. Many of the contextual factors that 
are considered important for inclusion in a model explaining punitiveness across Western 
societies are extensions of the individual-level factors already identified for inclusion. 
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COUNTRY-LEVEL CORRELATES OF PUNITIVENESS 
Characteristics of the country in which one lives can contribute to an individual’s 
level of punitiveness or how harshly they want to punish criminals and may influence the 
degree to which individuals can or cannot empathetically identify with criminal 
offenders. A handful of macro-level studies on public opinion toward crime and multi-
level studies on attitudes toward criminal punishment help identify the aspects of the 
social context that should be considered in a model of punitiveness to apply across 
Western societies. These studies suggest that objective, social structural and socially 
constructed factors at the country-level should be considered as influences on attitudes 
toward criminal punishment. The findings of these studies suggest that the following 
types of country-level factors should be considered: objective reality of crime, socially 
constructed realities of crime, population diversity and conservative climate. Figure 2 
provides a conceptual diagram of the country-level factors that should be included in a 
cross-national model of punitiveness. The following review of potential contextual-level 
influences on attitudes toward criminal punishment specifically outlines the aspects of 
each type of country-level factor that should be included in a model of punitiveness to 
apply in Western societies. 
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Objective Reality of Crime 
There is reason to believe that objective crime rate may influence attitudes toward 
criminal punishment. Individuals living in countries with higher levels of crime may be 
more punitive for several reasons. Those living in societies with higher crime rates may 
be more punitive for instrumental reasons (Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Tyler and Weber 
1982), consistent with the ideas previously mentioned such that people favor harsher 
criminal punishments in order to prevent or deter future crime. Those living in countries 
with higher violent crime rates have more exposure to violence and thus may be 
socialized to view violence as normal and therefore view violence or harshness, even 
violence and severe punishments officially meted out by the state (e.g. the death penalty) 
as appropriate (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003). High crime rates may also 
promote punitiveness by breaking down informal social controls which may lead to a 
sense of insecurity and thus lay a foundation for the support of punitive crime control 
policies (Garland 2000). 
Previous research does find crime rate to be positively related to individual and 
public support for the death penalty. U.S.-based studies find that high violent crime rates 
are associated with increased levels of public support for the death penalty (Rankin 1979) 
and also reveal that individuals living in communities with high homicide rates are 
significantly more supportive of the death penalty (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 
2003; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). In a cross-national study including both 
Western and non-Western nations Stack et al. (2007) find that individuals living in 
countries with high homicide rates are more supportive of the death penalty and harsher 
punishments for criminal offenders. Therefore, it is expected that individuals living in 
Western societies with higher levels of violent crime will be more punitive than those 
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who live in Western societies with lower levels of violent crime net of individual-level 
factors. 
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime 
Some scholars argue that socially constructed realities of crime, the frequency 
with which crime is discussed and the way crime is portrayed by elites, such as 
politicians and the media, influence public opinion on crime and punishment (Beckett 
and Sasson 2000). Also, recall that Unnever and Cullen (2009) consider the media and 
political elites to have great influence on how individuals construct images of offenders. 
There is evidence to suggest that political and media attention to crime can affect public 
opinion about crime. Beckett (1997) finds that U.S. public concern about crime and drugs 
is influenced by political attention to crime and drug policy. In the 1970s, U.S. public 
concern about crime did not precede increases in the severity of criminal punishment but 
instead followed enhanced attention given to the issue of crime policy by politicians and 
increased focus on crime by the media. Similar conclusions were made about public 
concern about drug use in the U.S. in the late-1980s and early-1990s. Attention by 
politicians (but not the media) to drugs and drug use preceded increases in public concern 
about drug use (Beckett 1997). Based on the above it is expected that individuals who 
reside in Western societies where “law and order” messages by politicians are more 
prevalent will prefer harsher criminal punishments than individuals living in Western 
societies where the “law and order” messages from politicians are less prevalent. Calls 
for law and order are often associated with conservative politicians. The next section 
considers how a conservative climate may influence punitiveness independent of whether 
or not a person holds a conservative worldview. 
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But first, there is another socially constructed reality to consider as influential on 
attitudes toward criminal punishment and that is public perception of police effectiveness. 
Just as personal perceptions of the police ineffectiveness may promote punitiveness, 
residing in a country where the wider public perceives the police as ineffective may lead 
individuals to be more punitive. If negative attitudes toward  police performance are 
common in a society, for example, where individuals are exposed to frequent messages 
from friends, family and/or the media that police are ineffective in preventing crime from 
occurring, this may generate a deep concern about crime and a keen interest for the 
reduction of crime among individuals living in that society. Individuals with more 
exposure to messages of police ineffectiveness may feel that criminals need to be locked-
up in order to prevent themselves and others from being victimized. Incapacitation may 
be seen as the only legal way to prevent criminals from engaging in crime. 
By contrast, individuals living within an environment where perceptions of the 
police as inadequate are pervasive may decide to take matters into one’s own hands by 
using violence to prevent victimization since the police cannot be relied upon in this 
regard. Kirk and Papachristos (2011:1191)  find that people living in socially 
disadvantaged neighborhoods while not tolerant of crime and lawlessness, will engage in 
violence in order to prevent personal victimization due a prevailing culture of legal 
cynicism where the law and its official enforcers are seen as “illegitimate, unresponsive 
and ill equipped to ensure public safety.”  Thus, individuals who live in environments 
with high levels of legal cynicism, including perceptions of police ineffectiveness, may 
be more punitive as well as willing to resort to violence in order to prevent future crime. 
Nonetheless, since this study is focused on punitiveness and not interpersonal violence, it 
is expected that individuals living in Western societies where public perceptions of police 
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as ineffective in controlling crime are more pervasive will prefer harsher punishments for 
criminals. 
Conservative Climate 
As mentioned in the previous section on individual-level correlates of 
punitiveness, previous research finds that individuals who self identify as politically 
conservative tend to be more punitive (Applegate et al. 2000; Baron and Hartnagel 1996; 
Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Browning and Cao 
1992; Costelloe et al. 2002; Maruna and King 2009; Stinchombe et al. 1980; Taylor, 
Schepple, and Stinchcombe 1979; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Unnever, 
Cullen, and Fischer 2007). Just as individuals who hold a conservative worldview may be 
more punitive, individuals living in societies with a conservative climate may also tend to 
be more punitive irrespective of their personal worldview be it conservative or otherwise. 
A conservative climate is conceived of here as one where political conservatism and 
conservative religious beliefs are common. Research does suggest that individuals living 
in a conservative environment are more punitive. Baumer et al. (2003) find that 
Americans who live in communities that are more politically conservative (i.e. contain a 
higher proportion of individuals who self-identify as politically conservative) are 
significantly more in favor of capital punishment than those who live in less politically 
conservative communities controlling for personal level of political conservatism and 
other individual-level correlates of punitiveness. Therefore, it is expected that individuals 
living in Western societies that are more politically conservative will be more punitive. 
While the relationship between conservative religious belief and punitiveness at 
the individual-level (reviewed in an earlier section) is modestly addressed in the 
criminological literature, the relationship between conservative religious belief in the 
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social context and attitudes towards punishment remains unexplored. However, given that 
those who subscribe to conservative protestant beliefs and politically conservative beliefs 
are likely to believe that criminal behavior is due to personal disposition and not due 
environmental factors (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Grasmick and McGill 1994) and 
that religious conservative belief is tied to ideas of retribution and notions of a great need 
to be protected from inherent evil as discussed above in the relationship between 
individual conservative belief and punitiveness, it is expected that individuals living in 
areas where conservative religious belief is more popular will be more punitive due to 
similar concerns. Thus, it is expected that individuals who live in societies with higher 
levels of conservative religious belief (i.e. where conservative religious beliefs are more 
popular) will be more punitive net of personal religious belief and other individual-level 
factors. 
While the relationship between conservative religious belief at the contextual-
level and punitiveness has not been explored in the previous research on attitudes toward 
criminal punishment, the relationship between religious conservatism at the country-level 
and lethal violence has been considered. Jensen (2006) argues and provides evidence that 
societies that have higher levels of conservative religious beliefs, specifically beliefs 
related to a vengeful God who is in constant battle with the Devil and absolute beliefs 
about good and evil, have higher levels of lethal violence. Jensen (2006) posits that in 
societies where these dualistic beliefs about good and evil prevail there exists a culture 
where people are offended more easily, are not very cooperative, nor very flexible, and 
where negotiations are difficult due to a perceived lack of “middle ground.” This 
contentious environment yields more conflict and vengeance in terms of lethal violence 
because God is seen as a vengeful, punitive and personal deity who will use violent 
means to fend off evil. Based on this argument it is possible that a climate of conservative 
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religious belief yields a higher homicide rate, which in turn, leads to higher levels of 
punitiveness. The possibility of a mediated relationship between the context of 
conservative religious belief and individual-level punitiveness through the homicide rate 
will be considered in the current study. Besides objective and socially constructed 
realities of crime and a conservative climate, the social structure such as population 
diversity may also influence individual attitudes toward punishment. 
Population Diversity 
Social structural factors such as population heterogeneity and income inequality 
may influence individual attitudes toward criminal punishment due to the threat of 
“other” groups encroaching on the privilege of majority groups, or because of a 
breakdown in normative consensus that may occur in societies with diverse populations 
in terms of race, ethnicity and religion. Minority threat and economic threat explanations 
suggest that states or communities in the U.S. with higher proportions of minority 
populations (usually percent black) and higher levels of economic stratification resulting 
in a larger economic underclass will have harsher criminal justice policies and public 
support for these policies due to the threat that the composition of these communities 
have on the privilege and status of the majority (whites) and the rich (Jacobs and 
Carmichael 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Baumer et al. (2003) examines the 
influence of racial and economic threat in U.S. support for the death penalty and finds 
that Americans living in communities with a higher proportion of blacks are significantly 
more in favor of capital punishment but does not find a significant relationship between 
income inequality and death penalty attitudes. 
While minority threat makes sense in the United States as an explanation for 
variation in criminal justice policy and support for these policies, these explanations are 
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not as easily applied to explain the variation in attitudes toward criminal punishment that 
occurs in other Western countries or across all Western societies. Individuals in Western 
societies beyond the U.S. may or may not be threatened by larger proportions of minority 
populations. If a threatening minority population does exist in countries outside of the 
U.S., this population is not likely to be uniform in type in terms of race or ethnicity across 
Western societies. In other words, the traditional conceptualization of minority threat in 
the U.S. focuses on the proportion of the population that is black and this 
conceptualization does not apply uniformly across Western societies. The black 
population may not be perceived as threatening across all Western societies and a 
threatening minority population may not be readily apparent in some Western societies. 
Perhaps a better approach to assessing threat or social unrest due to population 
composition in Western societies is to consider population heterogeneity. 
Population heterogeneity is the degree to which two randomly chosen individuals 
in a society do not belong to the same group (Blau 1977). Two types of heterogeneity that 
are likely to influence attitudes toward criminal punishment are ethnic and religious 
heterogeneity. The more ethnic groups there are in a society and the more even these 
groups are in size, the higher the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in that society. Likewise, 
the greater the number of religious groups in a population and the more even in size these 
various religious group are, the more religiously heterogeneous is that population. Higher 
degrees of ethnic and religious heterogeneity may promote punitiveness in a society 
because as Blau and Schwartz (1984) argue in their theory of multiform heterogeneity 
that when individual group membership across a variety of dimensions (ethnicity, 
religion, etc.) are not highly correlated more opportunities for social interactions across 
groups are created despite individual tendencies toward homophilly. Even though 
individuals prefer to spend time with people like themselves, population heterogeneity 
 37 
infiltrates this tendency and provides more opportunity for interaction between social 
groups. 
This increased intra-group interaction due to population heterogeneity may lead 
individuals in heterogeneous societies to perceive their society as not uniform. Due to the 
tendency for individuals to seek out friendships and interactions with those like 
themselves it is easy for most to feel secure that most people are like themselves and 
share the same cultural and moral upbringing. However, due to increased exposure to 
“other” groups in heterogeneous societies through random daily encounters, elite 
discourse and messages from the media, people living in more heterogeneous societies 
become more cognizant of the diversity that exists in their society. People become aware 
that there are others in society that are culturally different from themselves and this can 
lead to a sense of uneasiness and lack of trust which may ultimately lead to an increased 
desire to punish criminals more harshly. To the extent that people perceive religious 
groups that are different from their own as morally inferior or inadequate, religious 
heterogeneity may be especially influential on attitudes toward criminal punishment since 
the decision to engage or not engage in criminal behavior can be considered a moral 
issue. 
These dynamics are evidenced in a study by Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) who 
find, among Northern Californians, that concerns about the breakdown of social bonds, 
normative consensus and moral cohesion in society spurred by increases in the diversity 
of society are at the root of support for punitive crime control polices. Based on the above 
discussion on the potential influences of population diversity on punitiveness it is 
expected that those living in societies with higher levels of ethnic and religious 
heterogeneity will be more punitive. Since economic threat can be easily applied to 
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countries outside of the United States, it is expected that individuals living in countries 
with greater income inequality will be more punitive. 
In sum, the above review has identified several hypotheses about the individual 
and contextual influences on attitudes toward criminal punishment. Figure 3 provides a 
detailed multi-level conceptual diagram of the types of individual and country-level 
influences on attitudes towards criminal punishment including the specific hypotheses 
pertaining to these influences as they were outlined in this chapter. The next chapter 
describes the data and methodology used to test these hypotheses. 
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Chapter 3: Description of the Data and Methodology 
In order to investigate the influences of punitiveness across Western societies and 
test the model of punitiveness proposed in the previous chapter, this dissertation utilizes 
two separate international datasets: (1) the International Crime Victimization Survey 
(ICVS) and (2) the Voices of the People Millennium Survey (VPMS). Both datasets were 
obtained through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(ICPSR). Each dataset contains a single measure of punitiveness. In essence, the model of 
punitiveness is tested twice against two samples and two operationalizations of 
punitiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data and methodology used in 
these tests of the proposed model of punitiveness. The ICVS data and variables to be 
analyzed will be described first followed by a description of the VPMS data and variables 
that will be analyzed. Next, the country-level variables used in the analyses of both the 
ICVS and VPMS will be described. Finally, the methodology and plan of analyses will be 
described. Both datasets (and measures of punitiveness) are subject to the same plan of 
analyses. 
ICVS DATA 
Data from nineteen Western countries are found in the ICVS. The main sponsor 
for the ICVS is the United Nations Interregional Crime in Justice Research Institute in 
Turin, Italy. The ICVS data were collected in 1989, 1992, 1996, and 2000, with 
additional countries participating in each successive wave. Investigators administered the 
ICVS surveys by phone using a standardized method (computer assisted telephone 
interviewing [CATI]) to persons ages 16 and older (one person age 16 or older in the 
household was randomly selected to participate). The one exception to this is Poland 
where surveys were administered face-to-face with computer assistance. 
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Many countries conduct their own victimization surveys, but they are not ideal to 
use for comparative research because each country employs their own methods and 
survey procedures. The ICVS is unique in that it is the only victimization survey that uses 
a standardized design and procedures across all nations represented in the survey (van 
Kestern 2003). The most recent year available for each country was used in the analyses 
resulting in data from the following 19 countries in the given year: Australia 2000; 
Austria 1996; Belgium 2000; Canada 2000; Denmark 2000; England and Wales 2000; 
Finland 2000; France 2000; Italy 1992; The Netherlands 2000; New Zealand 1992; 
Northern Ireland 2000; Norway 1989; Poland 2000; Portugal 2000; Scotland 2000; 
Sweden 2000; Switzerland 1996; United States 2000. The data is nationally 
representative of households for each country included in the sample. The sample size for 
each country ranges from 1,000 to 5,276 resulting in a total sample size of 37, 751.6 
Table 1 describes the subset of ICVS data used for analyses (Country, year, response rate 
and N). The variation in response rate across countries is notable and this variation is 
taken into account in the analyses of the ICVS data. 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES 
Descriptive statistics for all individual-level variables from the ICVS are 
displayed in Table 2. 
Measurement of the Dependent Variable: Punitiveness 
Punitiveness was measured by the following ICVS survey question: “People have 
different ideas about the sentences which should be given to offenders. Take for instance 
                                                 
6 The ICVS data is not weighted.  While the dataset contains a weight variable named “Household Weight” 
a clear description this variable is absent in the metadata. Furthermore many cases on this variable are 
missing precluding its use in the analyses. [However, a household weight is not expected to make much of 
a difference in the results. After all, the samples for each country are nationally representative. The only 
concern is that small households were over sampled.] 
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the case of a man of 20 years old who is found guilty of burglary for the second time. 
This time he has taken a colour TV. Which of the following sentences do you consider 
the most appropriate sentence for such a case? (1) Fine (2) Prison (3) Community Service 
(4) Suspended Sentence or (5) Other.” Respondents who chose “other” were not included 
in the main analyses, and responses were re-coded into a dummy variable format (1 for 
prison sentence and 0 for non-prison sentence). 
Demographics 
The demographic variables available from the ICVS include: gender, age, income, 
education and marital status. Gender is coded as 0 for female and 1 for male. There are 
12 dummy variables for age due to the way age information was recorded by the ICVS. 
There is one dummy variable for each of the following age categories: age 16 to 19, age 
20 to 24, age 25 to 29, age 30 to 34, age 35 to 39, age 40 to 44, age 45 to 49, age 50 to 
54, age 55 to 59, age 60 to 64, age 65 to 70, age 70 and above. Age 45-49 is the reference 
category in all analyses. Income is a dummy variable. Respondents were asked “Could 
you please tell me whether the income of your whole household, after deductions for tax, 
etc., is below or above the current median income (provided by the interviewer)?” Above 
median income is coded as 1. Below median income is coded as 0. 
Education is an ordinal variable with twelve categories ranked from lowest to 
highest. Individuals who completed 0-9 years of education are coded as 1, the lowest 
category. Categories 2 through 11 represent one additional year of education after 9 years 
of education. Therefore, a code of 2 represents individuals with 10 years of education and 
a code of 11 represents individuals with 19 years of education. The final category 
represents individuals with 20 years of education or more. 
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The education variable is derived from three different survey questions. Most of 
the education data comes from the following question: “How many years of formal 
school and any higher education did you have?” Responses from 0 to 9 were coded as 1, 
the lowest categories. Responses from 10 years to 19 years were coded as 2 to 11, 
respectively. Responses of 20 years of education or more were coded as 12. Data for 
missing cases on the above question were obtained by the following question, if the 
respondent was asked the following question and provided a response: “How old were 
you when you completed your full time education at school, college or elsewhere?” 
Finishing school at ages 15-24 is coded as 2 to 12, respectively. Data missing from both 
of the above questions were obtained with yet another education question: “How would 
you define your level of education?” No education, less than primary education, and 
primary education are coded as 1. Secondary education is coded as 5. College is coded as 
8. Higher education or University is coded as 12.  Remaining missing data on education 
(where cases are missing information on all three of the above education questions) were 
multiply imputed with STATA’s ICE procedure that uses a series of logit regression 
analyses to estimate missing values. Finally, marital status is coded as 1 for married and 2 
for other (living together, single, divorced, or widowed). 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order 
The relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness 
will be tested using data from the ICVS on perceived risk of criminal victimization, 
attitudes toward the police, and criminal victimization. Perceived risk of victimization is 
operationalized with an ordinal variable based on the following question: “What would 
you say are the chances that over the next 12 months someone will try to break into your 
home? Do you think this is very likely, likely or not likely? “Not very likely” was coded 
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as 1, “likely” was coded as 2, and very likely was coded as 3. Perceived police 
ineffectiveness is measured by a single dummy variable based on the following 
questions: “taking everything into account, how good do you think the police in your area 
in controlling crime? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, a fairly 
poor job, or a very poor job?” Respondents who indicated that the police in their area do 
a fairly or very good job are coded as 0. Those who thought the police do a fairly poor or 
very poor job are coded as 1. These responses were dichotomized because all four 
category responses were recorded for the 2000 wave of the ICVS only. Data from 1989-
1996 were dichotomized by those coding the ICVS data. 







Australia 2000 58 2005 
Austria 1996 76 1507 
Belgium 2000 56 2501 
Canada 2000 57 2078 
Denmark 2000 66 3007 
England and Wales 2000 57 1947 
Finland 2000 77 1782 
France 2000 45 1000 
Italy 1992 61 2024 
Netherlands 2000 58 2000 
New Zealand 1992 65 2048 
Northern Ireland 2000 81 1511 
Norway 1989 71 1009 
Poland 2000 78 5276 
Portugal 2000 56 2000 
Scotland 2000 58 2055 
Sweden 2000 66 2001 
Switzerland 1996 56 1000 
USA 2000 60 1000 
Total N     37,751 
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for ICVS variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max Missing % Missing 
Dependent Variable       
Punitiveness       
Prison Sentence   N = 34310 0.32 0.47 0 1   
Individual-Level Variables       
Demographics       
Male 0.45 0.50 0 1 0 0 
Education 4.36 3.09 1 12 2240 6.53 
Age 16 – 19 0.04 0.20 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 20 – 24 0.07 0.25 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 25 – 29 0.09 0.28 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 30 – 34  0.10 0.30 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 35 – 39 0.11 0.31 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 40 – 44 0.10 0.30 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 45 – 49 0.09 0.28 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 50 – 54 0.09 0.28 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 55 – 59  0.07 0.26 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 60 – 64 0.06 0.25 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 65 – 70 0.06 0.24 0 1 194 0.57 
Age 71 + 0.11 0.32 0 1 194 0.57 
Income (abv median) 0.52 0.50 0 1 4005 11.67 
Marital Status 0.55 0.50 0 1 1024 2.98 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and 
Order 
    
  
Perceived Risk of Burglary 1.38 0.58 1 3 2695 7.85 
Victim of Violent Crime   0.12 0.32 0 1 34 0.10 
Victim of  Non-Violent Crime  0.06 0.25 0 1 146 0.43 
   Perceived Police 
Ineffectiveness 
0.28 0.45 0 1 
3838 11.19 
 
The ICVS includes questions about prior criminal victimization for the following 
crimes: theft from car, car damaged or vandalized, motorcycle theft, bicycle theft, 
burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, larceny (personal theft) and assault. As an 
example, the question for burglary is: “Over the past five years did anyone actually get 
into your house or flat without permission and steal or try to steal something. I am not 
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including here thefts from garages, sheds or lock-ups?” Two dummy variable were 
generated to measure prior victimization: victim of non-violent crime and victim of 
violent crime. Respondents are coded as 1 if they have been victims of violent crime, and 
0 if not. Likewise, respondents are coded as 1 if they have been victims of non-violent 
crime, and 0 if not. Violent criminal victimization includes robbery and assault. Non-
violent criminal victimization includes: car theft, car damage, theft from car, motorcycle 
theft, bicycle theft, personal theft, burglary and attempted burglary. A correlation matrix 
for all perception of law and order variables from the ICVS is provided in Table 3. The 
highest correlation between these variables is .16, thus multicollinearity is not much of a 
concern. 
Table 3.  Correlation Matrix for ICVS Variables Pertaining to Perception of Crime, Law 
and Order 
 1 2 3 4 
































Lastly, in order to maintain the largest sample size and retain as much information 
as possible for each variable missing data for individual-level independent variables were 
estimated through multiple imputation using STATA’s ICE procedure that uses the 
appropriate regression techniques (for this data, logit and ordinal regression) for each 
type of variable (dummy or ordinal). The number of missing cases is listed for each 
variable in Table 2. Missing data are randomly distributed across countries for every 
variable except for marital status. All respondents from Norway are missing data on 
marital status. Nonetheless, five imputations were conducted, yielding five distinct 
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datasets. All multivariate estimates generated using ICVS data are based on the combined 
analyses of these five datasets. 
VPMS DATA 
Data from 19 Western countries are found in the VPMS. The VPMS data were 
collected by the Gallup International Association 2000. The Western nations represented 
in the VPMS include: Austria, Canada, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The sample size for each 
country ranges from 500 to 1395 and each sample is nationally representative (N = 16, 
443). The data are weighted. Table 4 describes the subset of VPMS data used for 
analyses (Country, year, and N ).7 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES 
Descriptive statistics for all individual-level independent variables from the 
VMPS are displayed in Table 5. 
Measurement of the Dependent Variable: Punitiveness 
Punitiveness is measured by the following VPMS survey question: “Are you 
personally in favor or against the use of the death penalty?” The recorded responses are 
in favor of, against or don’t know. Responses were recoded into a binary variable (1 for 
in favor of the death penalty responses and 0 for against the death penalty responses and 
don’t know). This is a common way to code responses for yes/no survey questions about 
the death penalty (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Unnever and Cullen 2007; 
Applegate et al. 2000; Young and Thompson 1995; Rankin 1979; Unnever, Cullen, and 
                                                 
7 Response rates were not reported in the metadata associated with the VPMS. 
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Bartkowski 2006). An alternative way to code these responses is to code the “don’t 
know” responses as missing. In any case, the results in this study are not substantively 
different when the respondents who indicate “don’t know” are excluded in analyses. 
Table 4.  Description of VMPS Data used for Analysis (Country and N) 
Country Year Sample  
Size (N) 
Austria  2000 780 
Canada 2000 1038 
Belgium 2000 1001 
Czech Republic 2000 500 
Denmark 2000 1001 
Finland 2000 1049 
France 2000 1006 
Iceland 2000 619 
Ireland 2000 1395 
Italy 2000 1001 
Luxembourg 2000 500 
Netherlands 2000 902 
Norway 2000 552 
Poland 2000 968 
Spain 2000 602 
Sweden 2000 1000 
Switzerland 2000 502 
United Kingdom 2000 1022 
United States 2000 1005 










Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics for VPMS Data 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max Missing % Missing 
Dependent Variable       
Support for the Death Penalty 
(N=16443) 
0.34 0.47 0 1 0 0 
Individual-Level Variables       
Demographics       
Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 0 0 
Education 2.93 0.82 1 4 2989 18.18 
Age under18 0.05 0.22 0 1 984 5.98 
Age 18 – 24 0.12 0.33 0 1 984 5.98 
Age 25 – 34 0.20 0.40 0 1 984 5.98 
Age 35 – 44 0.19 0.40 0 1 984 5.98 
Age 45 – 54 0.17 0.37 0 1 984 5.98 
Age 55 – 64 0.13 0.34 0 1 984 5.98 
Age 65+ 0.13 0.34 0 1 984 5.98 
Married/Living Together 0.55 0.50 0 1 297 1.81 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order       
Crime Concern 3.20 0.79 1 4 116 0.71 
Conservative Religious Belief and 
Religiosity 
      
Personal God 0.38 0.48 0 1 485 2.95 
Spirit or Life Force 0.37 0.48 0 1 485 2.95 
Don’t Know What to Think About 
God 
0.13 0.34 0 1 485 2.95 
No God, Spirit or Life Force 0.12 0.32 0 1 485 2.95 
Religiosity 9.26 4.77 2 17 885 5.38 
Catholic 0.48 0.50 0 1 317 1.93 
 
Demographics 
The demographic variables include: gender, age, education and marital status. 
Gender is coded as 0 for female and 1 for male. There are 7 dummy variables for age due 
to the way information on respondent age was recorded by the VPMS. There is one 
dummy variable for each of the following age categories: Under 18, age 18 to 24, age 25 
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to 34, age 35 to 44, age 45 to 54, age 55 to 64, age 65. Age 45 to 54 is the reference 
category in all analyses. Education is an ordinal variable that represents four categories of 
education: no education, primary education, secondary education (high school), and 
university degree. Marital status is coded as 1 for married or living together and is coded 
as 0 for other (single, separated or divorced). Those married and living together where 
combined because that is the way data on respondent marital status was recorded for the 
VPMS. 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order 
The relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness 
will be tested using data from the VPMS on personal concern about crime. Personal 
concern about crime is operationalized with an ordinal variable based on the following 
question: “How concerned are personally about the level of crime in this country? A great 
deal, a fair amount, not very much, or not all?” Responses were coded so that higher 
values represent greater levels of concern. 
Conservative Religious Belief and Religiosity 
The most appropriate survey question available in the VPMS to help indicate 
conservative religious belief is the following:  “Which of the following statements comes 
closest to your beliefs? There is Personal God. There is some sort of spirit or life force. I 
don’t know what to think. I don’t really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life 
force.”  A dummy variable was created to represent each of the above beliefs. The 
reference category in all analyses is no belief in any sort of spirit, God, or life force. 
Belief in a personal God is considered indicative of conservative religious belief, but not 
at face value. In order to make this assumption religiosity needs to be accounted for. 
Finally, because being of the Catholic faith strongly suggests a lack of support for the 
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death penalty due to the position on the subject by the Catholic Church it is also 
accounted for. 
Religiosity is measured with a scale using VPMS data on church attendance and 
the importance of God. Church attendance is measured with an ordinal variable based on 
the following VPMS question: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about 
how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a 
week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often than once a year, 
or practically never? Responses were coded so that higher values represent more frequent 
church attendance. The importance of God is also measured with an ordinal variable and 
is based on the following question: “How important is God in your life? Please use this 
scale to indicate. Ten means very important and 1 means not at all important.” These two 
items were added to create a religiosity scale with an alpha of .70. Lastly, Catholicism is 
represented by a dummy variable, 1 if the respondent is Catholic and 0 if the respondent 
is not Catholic. 
A correlation matrix for all perceptions of crime, law and order, conservative 
religious belief, and religiosity variables from the VPMS variables is provided in Table 6. 
Table 6.  Correlation Matrix for VPMS Variables Pertaining to Perception of Crime, Law 
and Order, Conservative Religious Belief and Religiosity 







1. Crime Concern 1.00 0.11*** -0.02 -0.04*** -0.09*** 0.09*** 0.00 
2. Personal God 0.11*** 1.00 -0.60*** -0.30*** -0.29*** 0.48*** 0.20*** 
3  Spirit or Life Force -0.02 -0.60*** 1.00 -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.16*** -0.10*** 
4. DK What to Think About God  -0.04*** -0.30*** -0.30*** 1.00 -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.02*** 
5. No God, Spirit of Life Force -0.09*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.14*** 1.00 -0.31*** -0.14*** 
6. Religiosity 0.17*** 0.59*** -0.13*** -0.23*** -0.45*** 1.00 0.31*** 
7. Catholic 0.00 0.20*** -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.32*** 1.00 
 p ≤ .05 *p ≤ .01 **p ≤ .001*** 
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Finally, in order to maintain the largest sample size and retain as much 
information as possible for each variable with missing data in the VPMS, missing data 
were estimated using multiple imputation. STATA’s ICE procedure was used to multiply 
impute additional VPMS datasets. More specifically, the ICE procedure utilizes the 
appropriate regression techniques (for the VPMS data, logit and ordinal regression) for 
each type of variable (dummy or ordinal). Five imputations were conducted, yielding five 
distinct datasets. Missing data are randomly distributed across countries in most instances 
and specific information on missing data for the VPMS data are available in Table 5. 
However it must be noted that all respondents from Poland are missing data on age and 
education. Data on education is also missing from all respondents from Canada and the 
Netherlands. Nevertheless, all multivariate estimates generated using VPMS data are 
based on the combined analyses of these five datasets. 
COUNTRY-LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Country-level data on the objective reality of crime, socially constructed realities 
of crime, conservative climate, and population diversity were obtained from a variety of 
sources. These sources are identified below in the explanations of each country-level 
variable. The descriptive statistics for country-level variables are displayed in Tables 7 
and 8. All respondents from both surveys are assigned the values of their country of 
residence corresponding to the year in which they were given the survey (2000 for the 







Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Variables for Countries and Years 
Associated with the ICVS 
Country-Level Independent Variables     
 Mean SD Min Max 
Objective Reality of Crime     
Homicide Rate 1.91 1.07 0.80 5.52 
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime     
Law and Order as a Political Issue 160.06 159.21 0 649.7 
Public Perception of Police 
Ineffectiveness  
21.26 12.75 7 51 
Conservative Climate     
Conservative Religious Belief 13.03 5.05 4.05 21.50 
Church Attendance 21.68 16.42 2.66 59.18 
Political Conservatism 24.96 11.54 3.09 46.98 
Population Diversity     
  Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.71 
  Religious Heterogeneity 0.48 0.26 0.14 0.82 
  Income Inequality 29.42 4.42 22.50 36.70 
 
 
Table 8.  Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Variables for Countries and Year 
Associated with the VPMS 
Country-Level Independent Variables     
 Mean SD Min Max 
Objective Reality of Crime     
Homicide Rate   1.69  1.09 0.69 5.52 
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime     
Law and Order as a Political Issue 150.39 123.63 0 448.12 
Conservative Climate     
Conservative Religious Belief 11.85 4.89 4.05 21.50 
Church Attendance 19 16.82 2.28 59.18 
Political Conservatism 28.21 13.18 3.09 48.71 
Population Diversity     
  Ethnic Heterogeneity  0.25 0.21 .0586 .7124 
  Religious Heterogeneity 0.37 0.24 0.07 0.82 





Objective Reality of Crime 
The relationship between objective reality of crime at the country-level and 
punitiveness is tested with the homicide rate. The homicide rate is a measure of objective 
risk of victimization. The homicide rate for each Western country was calculated using 
raw homicide data obtained from Barclay and Tavares (2003) Home Office Statistical 
Bulletin 12/03 International Comparison of Criminal Justice Statistics 20008 where they 
compiled and reported data they collected from statistical sources in an impressive 
number of countries. Barclay and Tavares (2003) define homicide as the “intentional 
killing of a person excluding attempts including murder, manslaughter (excluding death 
by dangerous driving), euthanasia and infanticide but excluding abortion and help with 
suicide.” 
Barclay and Tavares (2003) had other crime data available but also provide a 
warning along with their data that “definitions of offences vary between countries both 
due to legal differences and statistical recording methods; comparisons may be affected 
by these differences.” In light of this, the homicide rate was chosen to measure the 
objective reality of crime as it is probably the most reliable measure of crime rates. The 
definition of homicide is not likely to differ across nations compared to the definitions of 
other crimes and is the most likely of all crimes to be reported. Thus, using homicide rate 
to measure objective risk of victimization minimizes the problems commonly associated 
with cross-national comparisons of crime. 
The population data (total mid-year) used in the creation of homicide rates are 
from the U.S Bureau of the Census, International Database, except for the UK countries. 
The Census does not provide separate values for England and Wales, Scotland and 
                                                 
8 This data is available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hosb1203tabs.xls 
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Northern Ireland. For these countries population data are from Barclay and Tavares 
(2003). 
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime 
The relationship between socially constructed realities of crime and punitiveness 
is tested using two measures: (1) the degree to which law and order is an issue of focus 
for politicians and the media; and (2) public perceptions of police ineffectiveness. 
Law and order as a political issue is operationalized using data derived from the 
Manifesto Dataset (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The Manifesto Dataset 
contains information on national parliamentary elections from OECD countries from 
1975 to1999 and for most countries from 1945 to 2003. Specifically, the Manifesto 
Dataset provides the quantitative results of a content analysis performed on the party 
manifestos or political documents providing information on the national political party 
platform and official stances on political issues for each political party in each national 
election from 1945 to 2003. Each sentence or quasi-sentence was coded into various 
areas of political interest and the percentage of sentences or quasi sentences for each area 
of political interest was calculated and reported.  
The policy area of interest for this study is law and order defined in the Manifesto 
codebook as positive mentions of “enforcement of all laws, actions against crime, support 
and resources for police and tougher attitudes in courts.” The Manifesto dataset also 
contains information on the percent of the popular vote that each political party received 
for every national election. Thus, law and order as a political issue is measured as the 
percentage of law and order messages in the manifesto of the winning party (received the 
most votes) multiplied by the percent of the popular vote the winning party received. 
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The winning party manifesto was chosen for use due to the assumption that the 
more popular the political party, the more inundated citizens are with political messages 
from that party during election time and otherwise. Further, the percent vote that the most 
popular party receives varies by country and degree of inundation with law and order 
messages may vary with the degree of popularity of the political party that received the 
highest percent of the popular vote. If the most popular political party in terms of highest 
number of votes or percentage of votes had a strong law and order message, citizens were 
more exposed to those messages through the media. The Manifesto dataset contains data 
for Great Britain and thus does not have varying values for England and Wales and 
Scotland. Therefore, England and Wales and Scotland share the same values for law and 
order as a political issue. 
Public perception of police ineffectiveness is a continuous variable representing 
the percent of the population that perceive the police as ineffective. This variable is 
constructed by aggregating the responses by country to the following question from the 
ICVS: “taking everything into account, how good do you think the police in your area in 
controlling crime? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, a fairly poor 
job, or a very poor job?” More specifically, this variable represents the percent of the 
national sample from each country who indicated that they thought the police do a fairly 
poor or a very poor job in controlling crime. Since the VPMS lacks data on public 
perceptions of the police, the relationship between public perception of police 
ineffectiveness and punitiveness is examined with the ICVS data only. 
Conservative Climate 
The relationship between a conservative climate and punitiveness is assessed with 
measures of political conservatism and conservative religious belief at the country level. 
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Political conservatism is measured using the Manifesto dataset described in the section 
above. Specifically, political conservatism is operationalized for each country by the 
percent of the population that voted for a conservative national party. For some countries 
no conservative parties were running in national elections in the year of the survey or the 
most recent national election preceding the survey year. In these cases, the percent of the 
population that voted for nationalist political parties are considered the percent that voted 
conservative. If countries did not have conservative or national parties running, the 
percentage that voted for Christian Democratic parties are coded as the percent that voted 
conservative. Christian Democratic parties are center-right parties, the most conservative 
party compared to socialist, liberal, communist, agrarian, ecological and ethnic parties in 
the absence of conservative or nationalist parties. 
Conservative Religious belief is measured with data from the World Values 
Survey9 (WVS). Three questions from the WVS were used to construct a scale of 
conservative religious belief:  (1) “Which statement comes closest to your point of view 
about what is good and evil?  (A) There are absolute clear guidelines about what is good 
and evil. These always apply to everyone, whatever the circumstances. (B) There can 
never be absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. What is good and evil 
depends entirely upon the circumstances at the time.” (2)  “Do you believe in hell?”  (3) 
“Do you believe in sin?” These three items are highly correlated with an alpha of .94 for 
ICVS countries and an alpha of .92 for VPMS countries. The conservative religious 
belief scale is the sum of the percentage of the population in each country that (1) 
indicated that absolute clear guidelines of good and evil comes closest to their point of 
view (2) believe in hell and (3) believe in sin. 
                                                 
9 The World Values Survey data are available on-line at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
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Finally, country-level data on church attendance was collected from the WVS to 
control for country-level religiosity. Church attendance is a continuous variable 
representing the percentage of the population that attends church at least once a week. It 
is based on the following question from the WVS: “Apart from weddings, funerals and 
christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than 
once a week, once week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, 
or never, practically never.” 
The Manifesto dataset and the World Values Survey contain data for Great Britain 
and thus do not have separate values for Scotland and England and Wales. Thus, England 
and Wales and Scotland share the same values for political conservatism, conservative 
religious belief and church attendance. 
Population Diversity 
The relationship between population diversity at the country-level and 
punitiveness is evaluated using three separate variables: ethnic heterogeneity, religious 
heterogeneity and income inequality. The heterogeneity data were obtained from Alesina 
and colleagues (2003)10 and income inequality data were primarily obtained from the 
OECD, and when not available from the OECD, the Luxemburg Income study was 
consulted. 
Alesina et al.’s (2003) treatment of “population diversity” is referred to as 
fractionalization and they provide ethnic and religious fractionalization data for 190 
countries. Each type of fractionalization is measured as one minus the Herfindahl index 
of group shares. This represents the probability that two randomly selected individuals 
                                                 
10 Data was obtained from Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and 
Romain Wacziarg. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8:155-194.  More detailed data on 
group names and group size is available from: 
http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html (retrieved on 4/29/2010) 
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from the same country belong to different groups. This definition of fractionalization is 
very similar to the sociological conception of heterogeneity11 therefore these 
fractionalization measures are considered population heterogeneity measures. The data 
that Alesina and colleagues used to compute religious fractionalization were obtained 
from Encyclopedia Britannica for the year 2001. 
The ethnicity data Alesina et al. (2003) used to create the ethnic fractionalization 
measure are from a variety of sources as Alesina and colleagues (2003) wanted to use 
data as disaggregated as possible and data sources were cross-checked. Alesina et al. 
(2003) used data from Encyclopedia Britannica for Australia (1986), Canada (1991), 
Czech Republic (1991), Denmark (1996), Ireland (1995), Italy (1983), Luxembourg 
(1996), Spain (1991) and the United Kingdom (1994)12 to compute ethnic 
fractionalization scores. Ethnicity data for Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal 
and Sweden were gathered from Levinson (1998) Ethnic Groups World Wide: A Ready 
Reference Handbook. Alesina et al. (2003) consulted the CIA World Fact Book (2000) 
for ethnicity data for Belgium, Finland and Switzerland. Finally, national census data 
were the source of ethnicity data for France (1999), New Zealand (1996), and the U.S. 
(2000). 
Income inequality data were primarily obtained from the Organization for 
Economic and Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2006). Gini-coefficients from 
the year 2000 provided by the OECD were used as measures of income inequality for 
Western countries in the sample that participated in the ICVS 2000 13 wave and the 
                                                 
11 According to Blau (1977), “the operational definition of the degree of heterogeneity in a population is 
that two randomly chosen persons do not belong to the same group.” 
12 Since Alesina et al. (2003) did not distinguish between England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, all of these countries were assigned the UK value for each population heterogeneity measure. 
13 The OECD also does not provide unique gini-coefficients for England and Wales, Scotland or Northern 
Ireland.  Therefore, the UK gini-coefficient was used for all three countries. 
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VPMS. The gini-coefficient for Belgium was not available through the OECD, so the 
Luxembourg Income Study14 was consulted to obtain Belgium’s gini-coefficient for the 
year 2000. Gini-coefficients from the mid-1990s provided by the OECD (2006) were 
used for Austria as it participated in the ICVS 1996 wave. 
The average of the gini-coefficients given by the OECD for the mid-1980s and 
mid-1990s were used as the measure of income inequality for Italy and New Zealand as 
they participated in the ICVS 1992 wave. Also, the OECD only reported a gini-
coefficient for Switzerland in the year 2000. Since Switzerland also participated in the 
1996 ICVS, the average of the 1992 and 2000 gini-coefficients provided by the 
Luxembourg Income Study was used as an estimate of income inequality for Switzerland 
for the ICVS only. Further the OECD, the Luxembourg Income Study and Alesina and 
colleagues only collected data on the UK and did not disaggregate the data by country. 
Therefore, Northern Ireland, England and Wales and Scotland have the same values for 
income inequality, ethnic heterogeneity and religious heterogeneity. 
Correlation Matrices are presented for all country-level variables. Table 9 
represents a correlation matrix including all country-level variables associated with the 
ICVS sample. Table 10 displays a correlation matrix including all country-level variables 
associated with the VPMS sample. Based on both correlation matrices it is apparent that 
church attendance and conservative religious belief are very highly correlated (r=.83, p 
<.001). It is also evident that income inequality is highly correlated to both church 
attendance (r=.90, p <.001) and conservative religious belief (r=.87, p <.001). While 
church attendance was initially conceptualized as a control variable these correlations 
                                                 
14 Gini-index data were obtained from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) for Belgium and Switzerland.  
The data is available at http://www.lisproject.org/key-figures/key-figures.htm. (Last retrieved on 
5/23/2008).  The Gini-index data provided by the LIS was multiplied by 100 to make it comparable to the 
Gini-Coefficients provided by OECD for the rest of the countries in the sample. 
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reveal the inappropriateness of including any combination of conservative religious 
belief, church attendance and income inequality in the same hierarchical logistic 
regression model. Therefore, when testing the relationship between conservative climate 
and punitiveness, the effects of church attendance and conservative religious belief on 
punitiveness will be assessed separately. 
It is also noteworthy that the correlations between many of the country-level 
variables are very strong despite attaining statistical significance. The only reason they 
are not statistically significant is because the sample size is only 19 countries. 
 
Table 9.  Correlation Matrix for Country-Level Variables Applied to ICVS Data 











1. Homicide Rate 1.00 0.40 -0.22 0.67 0.49 0.62 0.32 0.46 0.53 
2. Law and Order  
      as a Political Issue 0.40 1.00 -0.32 0.29 0.25 0.38 0.57 0.37 0.27 
3. Public Perception  







4. Conservative Religious Belief 0.67 0.29 0.18 1.00 0.83
***
 0.57 0.23 0.41 0.87
***
 
5. Church Attendance  0.49 0.25 0.51 0.83
***
 1.00 0.32 0.16 0.07 0.80
**
 
6. Political Conservatism 0.62 0.38 -0.41 0.57 0.32 1.00 0.15 0.55 0.34 
7. Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.32 0.57 -0.32 0.23 0.16 0.15 1.00 0.35 0.17 
8. Religious Heterogeneity 0.46 0.37 -0.59 0.41 0.07 0.55 0.35 1.00 0.26 




 0.34 0.17 0.26 1.00 
 p ≤ .05 
*




      
 
PLAN OF ANALYSES 
Hierarchical or multi-level logistic regression models of punitiveness are 
estimated in order to test the model of punitiveness proposed in chapter 2. HLM6 
software is used and multiple imputation techniques are employed in estimation. Multi-
level models are useful in that they account for the nested nature of the ICVS and VPMS 
data where individuals are situated within countries. Since residents of the same country 
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are more likely to be similar to each other than similar to residents of other nations errors 
are not independent. Hierarchical modeling corrects for this and uses the correct degrees 
of degrees of freedom for country-level analysis. 
Table 10.  Correlation Matrix for Country-Level Variables Applied to VPMS Data 









1. Homicide Rate 1.00 0.24 0.53 0.34 0.42 0.22 0.52 0.42 
2. Law and Order as a Political Issue 0.24 1.00 0.33 0.36 -0.14 0.68
*
 0.35 0.32 
3. Conservative Religious Belief 0.53 0.33 1.00 0.87
***
 0.48 0.24 0.27 0.88
***
 
4. Church Attendance 0.34 0.36 0.87
***
 1.00 0.36 0.21 0.08 0.08 
5. Political Conservatism 0.42 -0.14 0.48 0.36 1.00 0.15 0.47 0.44 
6. Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.22 0.68
*
 0.24 0.21 0.15 1.00 0.18 0.20 
7. Religious Heterogeneity 052 0.35 0.27 0.08 0.47 0.18 1.00 0.28 




 0.44 0.20 0.28 1.00 
 p ≤ .05 
*




     
 
While country-level variation in punitiveness is apparent by observing the 
frequencies of the dependent variables (see Chapter 4, Table 11) significant variation has 
to be formally established across countries before multi-level models can be estimated. 
This variation needs to be established in order to evaluate the strength of each model of 
punitiveness. Therefore, for this initial step, a two-level, unconditional model is estimated 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) to confirm that there is significant variation between 
countries in punitiveness. 
The equation for the formal unconditional model predicting punitiveness for 
individual i located in country j is: 
Log [p(Punitivenessij =1)/(1-p( Punitivenessij =1))]= 0j (1) 
where 0j (the intercept) is specified at the second level as: 
 0j = 00 + u0j (2) 
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and u0j represents random error among countries which is assumed to be normal with 
variance τ. The intercept 0j has a subscript j which indicates that each country in the 
sample has a unique intercept. From this we estimate the amount of variance between 
countries on the dependent variable of interest (Punitivenessij) (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002).  
Now that significant variation between countries in punitiveness has been 
established equation 1 is expanded to include individual-level variables (such as 
Educationij): 
Log [p(Punitivenessij =1)/(1-p( Punitivenessij =1))]= 0j + 1j Educationij (3) 
The next chapter (chapter 4) reports the unconditional model (equation 1 above) 
and the expansion of this model to include individual-level variables (equation 3 above) 
for the ICVS measure of punitiveness or preference for prison for a recidivist burglar. 
Chapter 4 also reports the same models for the VPMS measure of punitiveness or support 
for the death penalty. Equation 2 above can also be expanded to include independent 
country-level variables that may explain a proportion of the variance in punitiveness 
between countries. In this way, the unique effects of living in a particular Western 
country are estimated at level 2, the country level (j): 
 
0j = 00 + 01Homicide Ratej + u0j (4) 
 
Therefore, 01 represents the effect of the country-level homicide rate (Homicide 
Ratej) on individual punitive attitudes (Punitivenessij). Theoretically, individuals living in 
countries with different values on the Homicide Ratej will have different likelihoods of 
being punitive (Punitivenessij), either preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar 
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or supporting the death penalty. Chapter 5 reports estimates of equation 4 above for 
punitiveness conceptualized as preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar. 
Chapter 6 reports estimates of equation 4 above for punitiveness conceptualized as 
support for the death penalty. 
All models are estimated with the HLM6 software (Raudenbush et al. 2004) using 
the multiple imputation option based on Rubin’s (1987) formulas. All individual-level 
independent ordinal variables are centered around the grand mean which means that 
individual values are converted into deviations from the overall sample mean. Individual-
level independent variables that are binary are left uncentered. Country-level independent 
variables (they are all continuous) are also centered around the grand mean. Therefore, 
the intercepts in all multi-level logistic regression models (equation 4 above) can be 
interpreted as the odds of being punitive for the hypothetical Western citizen who 
belongs to the suppressed category for all dummy variables, who is average on all 
ordinal-level variables, and who lives in a hypothetical Western country that is average 
on all country-level variables. Lastly, chapter 7 is the conclusion of the dissertation where 














Chapter 4:  Variation in Punitiveness Across Western Societies and 
Individual-Level Influences on Punitiveness 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and assess the variation in public 
punitiveness across Western societies and to investigate individual-level influences on 
punitiveness. Table 11 displays variation in punitiveness across Western societies for 
both measures of punitiveness. In this table countries are listed in descending order on 
punitiveness. The country with the greatest amount of public support for prison as 
punishment for a second burglary conviction is listed first. 
Table 11 reveals some congruence between countries on both indicators of 
punitiveness. Those countries that are most in favor of prison are also most in favor of the 
death penalty. The United States is the most punitive in terms of preference for prison 
and support for the death penalty, with U.S. citizens slightly more in favor of the 
existence of death penalty than they prefer prison sentences to be meted out for repeat 
burglary offenders. The UK and Canada are right below the U.S. in terms of punitiveness 
for both preference for prison and support for the death penalty; however, those from the 
UK and Canada are less in favor of the death penalty than they are in support of a prison 
sentence for a recidivist burglar. Other than the above observations, few similarities are 
found in the ordering of countries for both measures of punitiveness. While citizens in 
Italy, Denmark and Norway seem to favor prison and the death penalty at similar levels 
within their country, most countries differ considerably in the degree to which their 
citizens support prison as an appropriate punishment for a recidivist burglar and the 







Table 11.  Countries Ranked by Percentage of Public Support for a Recidivist Burglar 
and Support for the Death Penalty 
Country Rank Prison Sentence Rank Death Penalty 
USA 1 63.94% 1 67.96% 
Northern Ireland* 2 57.71% 3 50.29% 
Scotland 3 56.49% 3 50.29% 
England and Wales 4 54.87% 3 50.29% 
Canada 5 49.33% 5 47.88% 
Netherlands 6 41.28% 8 35.37% 
Australia 7 40.81% -- --- 
Sweden 8 32.44% 16 17.70% 
Portugal 9 27.83% --- --- 
New Zealand 10 27.56% --- --- 
Italy 11 26.62% 11 26.77% 
Poland 12 22.96% 4 49.17% 
Belgium 13 21.58% 7 39.86% 
Denmark 14 20.96% 14 19.48% 
Finland 15 19.49% 9 35.27% 
Norway 16 14.75% 18 15.58% 
France 17 12.66% 6 41.75% 
Switzerland 18 10.61% 13 25.10% 
Austria 19 10.49% 12 25.51% 
Czech Republic -- --- 2 59.50% 
Luxembourg -- --- 10 32.80% 
Spain -- --- 15 19.27% 
Ireland -- --- 17 17.56% 
Iceland -- --- 19 13.41% 
*N. Ireland, Scotland, and England and Wales have the same values for the Death Penalty because 
 the VPMS did not disaggregate the UK countries 
 
Within countries there is, more often than not, a higher degree of support for the 
use of the death penalty as a punishment in general than there is preference for prison as a 
criminal punishment for a recidivist burglar. France, one of the countries with the least 
support for prison as a response to repeat burglary (less than 13% support), has over triple 
this amount of support for the overall use of death penalty. Switzerland which has even 
less public preference for prison as a punishment for a second burglary offense than 
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France (less than 11% support), has over double this amount of support for the death 
penalty. Poland, fourth place among the countries of interest in support of the death 
penalty with 49% of public support, has less than half this amount of support for the use 
of prison as a punishment for a recidivist burglar. Belgium and Finland also retain more 
public support for the general use of the death penalty at nearly 40% for Belgium and 
35% for Finland than support for sending a repeat burglar to prison with only 21.5% 
support in Belgium and 19% support in Finland. 
The Netherlands and Sweden have the opposite trend of the above countries in 
that the citizens of the Netherlands and Sweden favor the use of prison for a recidivist 
burglar more than the use of the death penalty in general. While the 32% of the Swedish 
public favors prison for a repeat burglar, only 18% are in favor of the general use of the 
death penalty. In a similar, though not nearly as dramatic way, public support for prison 
as punishment for a second burglary offense is 41% in the Netherlands while support for 
the death penalty as a criminal punishment in the Netherlands is 35%. 
No information on public support for the death penalty is available in the VPMS 
for New Zealand, Australia and Portugal and no information on punishment preferences 
for a recidivist burglary is available in the ICVS for the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, 
Ireland and Iceland. Thus, comparisons within these countries on support for these two 
criminal justice policies cannot be made. 
Variation across Western countries in punitiveness is very apparent across 
Western countries in Table 11. The range of public support for prison as an appropriate 
sentence for repeat burglary is 10.5% (Austria) to 64% (U.S) while the range of public 
support for the death penalty is 13% (Iceland) to 68% (U.S.) with the remaining countries 
pretty evenly distributed within these ranges. While the variation in both measures of 
punitiveness is clearly indicated in the above tables, the variation needs to be statistically 
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established in order to fully test the multi-level model of punitiveness proposed in 
Chapter 2. This is done by estimating an unconditional model (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002). Model 1, Table 12 displays an unconditional model for punitiveness measured as 
preference for prison for a recidivist burglar. Model 1, Table 13 shows an unconditional 
model for punitiveness measured as support for the death penalty. Estimates from both 
unconditional models reveal significant variation across countries for each measure of 
punitiveness (τˆ = .720, p =.000 for preference for prison and τˆ = .714, p =.000 for 
support for the death penalty). These estimates indicate that the degree of variation across 
countries in punitiveness is quite similar for both measures of punitiveness. 
Tables 12 and 13 also display a conditional model (model 2) that includes the 
individual-level variables proposed to be associated with punitiveness. Model 2, Table 12 
tests the individual-level hypotheses about punitiveness concerning demographics and 
perceptions of crime, law and order with data from the ICVS. In terms of the 
relationships between demographics and punitiveness, recall that women and individuals 
with more education are expected to be less punitive and that males, individuals with less 
education, individuals who are married, individuals who have higher incomes, and older 
individuals are expected to be more punitive. As far as the relationship between 
perceptions about crime, law and order and punitiveness, individuals who perceive their 
risk of victimization to be high, individuals who perceive the police as ineffective, and 
individuals who have been victims of violent crime are expected to be more punitive. 
Using ICVS data support is found for most of the hypotheses concerning 
demographics. Model 2, Table 12 reveals males to be significantly more in favor of 
prison for a recidivist burglar than women and that those who are more educated are 
significantly less in favor of prison for a repeat burglary offense than those with more 
education. The odds of choosing a prison sentence for a repeat burglary are 40% higher 
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for males that females. With each increase in level of education the odds of choosing a 
prison sentence as punishment for a second burglary offense decrease by 7%. Those who 
are married are significantly more in favor of prison for a repeat offense of burglary. The 
odds that married individuals choose a prison sentence are 8% higher than the odds that 
unmarried individuals choose a prison sentence. 
Contrary to expectation, younger individuals tend to be more in favor of prison 
for a second burglary offense than older individuals. Specifically, those younger than 40 
years of age appear to be more punitive in terms of punishment preferences for a 
recidivist burglar than those above the age of 40. Also, unexpectedly, model 2, Table 12 
shows that individuals with incomes above the median are significantly less in favor of 
prison for repeat non-violent offenses than those with lower incomes. Specifically those 
with incomes above the median income in their country of residence have 11% lower 
odds of opting for a prison sentence as punishment for a second offense of burglary than 
those with incomes that fall below the median income of their country. 
Now turning to the relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and 
punitiveness, all of the hypotheses concerning this relationship are supported by the 
ICVS data. There is a positive and significant relationship between perceived risk of 
burglary and preference for prison as a punishment for a repeat burglar. As one’s 
perceived risk of criminal victimization shifts from not very likely to likely or likely to 
very likely, the odds that they choose a prison sentence for the second offense of burglary 
increases by 12.5%. There is also a positive and significant relationship between previous 
violent victimization and choosing a prison sentence for a second burglary conviction. 
Those who have been violently victimized are nearly 13% more likely to choose a prison 
sentence for a recidivist burglar than those who have not experienced violent 
victimization. There is no significant relationship between nonviolent victimization and 
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preferring a prison sentence for a repeat burglar. Finally, those who perceive the police as 
ineffective are significantly more likely to prefer a prison sentence for a second 
conviction of burglary. The odds of choosing a prison sentence are 16.5% higher for 
those who perceive the police as ineffective compared to those who do not share this 
perception. 
Model 2, table 13 displays additional tests of some of the individual-level 
hypotheses on the relationship between demographics and punitiveness and perceptions 
of crime, law and order and punitiveness using VPMS data. Model 2, Table 13 also 
contains the results of testing the hypotheses concerning conservative religious belief, 
religiosity and punitiveness. To reiterate these hypotheses, it is expected that individuals 
who hold conservative religious beliefs will be more punitive that those who do not while 
individuals with higher levels of religiosity will be less punitive than those with lower 
levels of religiosity. Support is found for all of the individual-level hypotheses tested with 
the VPMS data. 
As found with the ICVS data males, married individuals, some younger 
individuals, and people who are more concerned about crime are significantly more 
punitive while individuals with higher levels of education are significantly less punitive. 
The odds of favoring the death penalty are 37% higher for males than females. Those 
who are married have 40% higher odds of supporting the death penalty than those who 
are not married. Individuals between the ages of 25 and 34 are significantly more in favor 
of the death penalty that those between the ages of 45 and 54. The odds that those 
between the ages of 25 and 34 indicate support for the death penalty are 16.5% higher 
than the odds that those between the ages of 45 and 54 will report support for the death 
penalty. In terms of the relationship between education and punitiveness, each increase in 
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level of education corresponds with a 13% decrease in the odds of favoring the death 
penalty. 
Table 12.  The Unconditional and Individual-Level Only Hierarchical Logistic 
Regression Models for Preference for Prison. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Demographics 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
 Male    1.408 
***
 -0.031 
 Education    0.93 
***
 -0.005 
 Age 16 – 19    1.311 
**
 -0.087 
 Age 20 – 24    1.394 
***
 -0.078 
 Age 25 – 29    1.509 
***
 -0.063 
 Age 30 – 34    1.382 
***
 -0.06 
 Age 35 – 39    1.353 
***
 -0.059 
 Age 40 – 44    1.106  -0.063 
 Age 50 – 54    0.945  -0.062 
 Age 55 – 59    1.039  -0.066 
 Age 60 – 64    1.024  -0.072 
 Age 65 – 69    1.141  -0.078 
 Age 70+    1.126  -0.065 
 Income (> median)    0.889 
***
 -0.032 
 Married    1.078 
*
 -0.031 
Perceptions of Crime, Law  
     and Order       
Perceived Risk of Burglary     1.125 
***
 -0.025 
Victim of Violent Crime    1.128 
**
 -0.04 
Victim of Non-violent Crime     0.951  -0.028 
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness    1.165 
***
 -0.041 
 -0.855    
 
 
Intercept (coefficient)  
***
 -0.195 -1.186 
***
 -0.217 
 0.72      
Country-Level Variance  
***
  0.821 
***
  
p ≤ .05 
*
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Table 13.  The Unconditional and Individual-Level Only Hierarchical Logistic 
Regression Models for Support for the Death Penalty 
 Model 1 Model 2 




 SE Ratio Ratio 
 Male    1.372 
***
 -0.043 
 Education    0.872 
***
 -0.029 
 Age Under 18    1.023  -0.119 
 Age 18 – 24    1.139  -0.074 
 Age 25 – 34    1.166 
*
 -0.068 
 Age 35 – 44    1.08  -0.065 
 Age 55 – 64    1.001  -0.071 
 Age 65+    0.985  -0.067 
 Married/Living Together    1.4 
***
 -0.056 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order       
Crime Concern     1.359 
***
 -0.03 
Conservative Religious Belief  
     and Religiosity       
Personal God    1.248 
**
 -0.087 
Spirit or Life Force    1.081  -0.078 
Don’t Know What to Think About 
God    1.036  -0.089 
Religiosity    0.949 
***
 -0.006 
Catholic    0.832 *** -0.046 








    
   






      
 
p ≤ .05 
*




      
 
 
Turning to another examination of the relationship between perceptions of crime, 
law and order and punitiveness, analyses based on the VPMS data reveal that those who 
are personally more concerned about crime are significantly more likely to favor the 
death penalty. For every increase in level of personal concern about crime, the odds of 
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declaring support for the death penalty increase by 36%. With regard to the relationship 
between conservative religious belief and punitiveness analyses reveal that those who 
believe in a personal God, a belief consistent with conservative protestant belief 
especially when personal level of religiosity is controlled for, are significantly more in 
favor of the death penalty that those who do not believe in any God. In fact, those who 
believe in a personal God have 25% higher odds of supporting the death penalty than 
those who do not believe in any God. It is worth noting that no significant difference is 
found between individuals who believe in a spirit or life force or don’t know what to 
think about God and those who do not believe in any God in terms of support for the for 
the death penalty. Also consistent with expectation, each increase in degree of personal 
religiosity corresponds with a 5% decrease in the odds of favoring the death penalty. 
Being Catholic also decreases the odds of support for the death penalty by 17%. 
Beyond revealing the individual-level factors that are significantly related to 
punitiveness, model 2 in both Tables 13 and 14 also indicate a larger variance component 
compared to the unconditional model, or model 1. This means that after controlling for 
individual-level predictors of punitiveness, there is more variation between countries in 
public punitiveness. This also indicates that the individual-level predictors of 
punitiveness are not particularly helpful in explaining any of the variation in public 
punitiveness across countries. If the variance component of model 2 was smaller than the 
variance component in model 1, some of the between-country variance in punitiveness 
would be attributable to the individual-level predictors. However, this is not the case. 
Now that the variation between countries in punitiveness has been described and 
statistically established and individual-level influences on punitiveness have been 
considered, it is time to investigate the role that social context plays in shaping individual 
attitudes toward criminal punishment. The next two chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) illustrate 
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and interpret estimates of further expanded models to those presented in the Tables 13 
and 14. These expanded conditional models consider contextual or country-level 
influences on punitiveness and test the country-level hypotheses that stem from the multi-
level model of punitiveness presented in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 5:  Testing the Multi-Level Model of Punitiveness on 
Punishment Preferences for a Recidivist Burglar 
This chapter reports the results of a full test of the multi-level model of 
punitiveness presented in Chapter 2 using the ICVS data. This chapter is an extension of 
the analyses started in Chapter 4 with ICVS data (Table 12). Chapter 4, Table 12 is 
dedicated to testing the individual-level aspects of the multi-level model of punitiveness 
presented in Chapter 2. This chapter adds to those results with an investigation of the role 
that social context plays in shaping individual attitudes about the appropriate punishment 
of a recidivist burglar. 
Specifically, this chapter is focused on uncovering the expected relationships 
between each of the following types of contextual-level factors and punitiveness 
measured as punishment preferences for a repeat burglar: (1) objective reality of crime 
(2) socially constructed realities of crime (3) conservative climate (4) population 
diversity. To briefly review the hypotheses concerning the social context and 
punitiveness outlined in Chapter 2 the following is a list of expected relationships 
between the social context at the country level and punishment preferences for a 
recidivist burglar. It is expected that individuals who live in countries with higher 
homicide rates; individuals who live in countries where law and order is a significant 
political issue; individuals who live in countries where public perceptions of police 
ineffectiveness are more common; individuals who live in countries with higher levels of 
political conservatism; individuals who live in countries where conservative religious 
belief is more common; individuals who live in countries that are ethnically diverse; 
individuals who live in countries that are religiously diverse and individuals who live in 
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countries with higher levels of income inequality will be more punitive and thus prefer a 
prison sentence for a repeat burglar. 
The results of hierarchical logistic regression analyses used to test these 
hypotheses are displayed in Table 14. As predicted, model 3 of Table 14 reveals a 
significant relationship between the objective reality of crime and individual punitiveness 
indicating that individuals who live in countries with higher homicide rates have 
significantly higher odds of choosing a prison sentence for a repeat burglar. Further, 
homicide rate explains 15% of the variation in public support for sentencing recidivist 
burglars to prison. 
Model 4, Table 14 shows mixed support for a significant relationship between 
socially constructed realities of crime and individual punitiveness. Public perceptions of 
police as ineffective is not significantly related to punitiveness while law and order as a 
political issue is positively and significantly related to punitiveness. This indicates that 
individuals who live in countries with more exposure to law and order messages have 
significantly higher odds of preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar compared 
to individuals living in countries where law and order messages are less prominent. Law 
and order as a political issue fairs better that homicide rate in explaining variation in 
punitiveness across Western societies. Specifically, law and order as a political issue 
explains 22% of the variability across Western societies in the type of punishment 
preferred for a repeat burglar. 
Model 5, Table 14 suggests no significant relationship between conservative 
climate and punitiveness; however, it appears that model 5 simultaneously explains 
nothing and everything about variation in punitiveness across Western societies. Despite 
no significant relationship found between political conservatism and punitiveness nor 
conservative religious belief and punitiveness, these contextual measures appear to 
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explain a higher proportion of the variation in punitiveness across countries than 
homicide rate considered alone or law and order as a political issue considered alone. 
This is indicated by a smaller variance component associated with model 5 than models 3 
and 4 (.471 versus .612 and .557, respectively). Further, the consideration of conservative 
climate as an influence on punitiveness renders insignificant all previously significant 
individual-level predictors of punitiveness. 
Similar results are evident when the relationships between country-level political 
conservatism and punitiveness and the relationship between conservative religious belief 
and punitiveness are considered separately. Thus, it appears that political conservatism 
and conservative religious belief at the country-level explain individual-level differences 
in punitiveness but do not help to explain differences in punitiveness across Western 
societies. 
However, since conservative religious belief was measured with a scale 
comprised of the sum of the prevalence of three separate religious beliefs, the 
relationships between each of these beliefs and punitiveness can be explored further. To 
this end three supplements to model 5 (model 5a, 5b, and 5c) are estimated, one for each 
religious belief represented in the conservative religious belief scale. The beliefs included 
in the conservative religious belief scale include: (1) belief in a literal hell (2) belief in sin 
and (3) belief in absolute standards of good and evil. Finally, a fourth model (model 5d) 
is estimated to further evaluate the relationship between country-level conservative 
religious belief and punitiveness. This model evaluated the relationship between church 
attendance and punitiveness. Initially, country-level church attendance was 
conceptualized as a control variable, however country-level church attendance is too 
highly correlated (r > .80) with the prevalence of each conservative religious belief being 
explored to evaluate the relationships between country-level conservative religious belief 
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and punitiveness controlling for country-level church attendance. Thus, the relationship 
between country-level church attendance and punitiveness is tested separately in model 
5d. 
Model 5a, Table 14 reveals that the percent of the population who believes in hell 
is significantly and positively related to punitiveness. Those who live in countries where 
a higher proportion of the population believes in hell have higher odds of preferring a 
prison sentence for a recidivist burglar than those who live in countries with a lower 
proportion of the population to believe in a literal hell. Further, belief in a literal hell at 
the country-level explains nearly 22% of the variation in public punitiveness between 
Western societies. 
Similarly, model 5b in Table 14 indicates that the percent of the population who 
believes in absolute standards of good and evil is positively and significantly related to 
individual punitiveness. Those who live in societies with a higher proportion of the 
population that believe in absolute standards of good and evil have higher odds of 
choosing a prison sentence for a second conviction of burglary than individuals who live 
in societies where a lower proportion of the population believes in absolute standards of 
good and evil. Country-level belief in absolute standards of evil accounts for 17.5% of 
country variation across Western societies. Contrary to the other findings for singular 
country-level conservative religious beliefs, country-level belief in sin is not significantly 
related to individual punitiveness (see Model 5c). 
Model 6, Table 14 considers the relationship between population diversity and 
individual punitiveness. The types of population diversity tested as potential predictors of 
punitiveness include: ethnic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity and income inequality. 
The results reveal that only religious heterogeneity is positively and significantly related 
to individual punitiveness. Individuals who live in more religiously heterogeneous 
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societies have significantly higher odds of preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist 
burglar than individuals who live in more religiously homogeneous societies. Net of 
individual factors and taking into account any relationships between ethnic heterogeneity 
and punitiveness and income inequality and punitiveness, religious heterogeneity 
explains nearly 33% of the variation in punitiveness across Western societies in terms of 
punishment preferences for a second conviction of burglary. 
To summarize, the analyses thus far indicate that homicide rate, law and order as 
a political issue, belief in a literal hell, and religious heterogeneity are all positively 
related to individual-level punitiveness when considered on their own. Belief in absolute 
standards of good and evil is also positively related to punitiveness, but belief in hell is 
considered a stronger measure of conservative religious belief due to its smaller p-value 
(p=.009) and that it alone explains a higher proportion of variation in punitiveness across 
Western countries than belief in absolute standards of good and evil. Therefore, belief in 
absolute standards of good and evil is not considered in further analyses. 
Analyses now turn to comparing country-level predicators in their ability to 
explain variance across Western societies in punishment preferences for a second 
burglary. Model 7, Table 14 investigates the comparative explanatory power of religious 
heterogeneity and belief in hell. Both remain positive and statistically significant 
predictors of individual punitiveness and together explain nearly 43% of the variation in 
punishment preferences for a recidivist burglar. Model 8 reveals religious heterogeneity 
and law and order as a political issue to be significant and positive predictors of 
individual-level punitiveness. The significance of the relationship between punitiveness 
and law and order as a political issue is marginal (p=.052), however, since the sample 
size is only 19 one could argue that this is a significant finding rather than marginally 
significant finding. However, law and order as a political issue is not nearly as helpful in 
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explaining variation in punitiveness across Western societies compared to the joint effect 
of religious heterogeneity or belief in hell. Religious heterogeneity and law and order as a 
political issue considered in the same model explain 39.72% of the variation in individual 
punitiveness across countries. Model 9, Table 14 reveals that when both religious 
heterogeneity and homicide are considered together, religious heterogeneity remains a 
significant predictor of individual punitiveness while homicide rate does not. 
Model 10, Table 14 is a visual representation of what happens when two highly 
correlated variables are included in the same model, in this case homicide rate and law 
and order as a political issue. The high correlation between homicide rate and law and 
order as a political issue (r = .40) yields insignificant results in a model including both 
predictors of punitiveness. This suggests that countries that have higher homicide rates 
are also countries where law and order is a significant political issue. The significant 
decrease in the coefficient for homicide rate suggests that law and order as a political 
issue partially mediates the relationship between the homicide rate and individual 
punitiveness. These findings suggest that the extent to which law and order becomes a 
political issue is a reflection of the homicide rate and is not socially constructed by 
politicians and the media independent of the crime rate. It is likely that the public 
becomes aware of the level of objective risk of victimization to the extent to which 
politicians and the media call for more “law and order” in order to decrease the crime rate 
or “fix” the crime problem. Nonetheless, while model 10 sheds light on whether socially 
constructed realities or objective realities of crime shape punitiveness, these types of 
contextual factors are not the strongest explanatory factors for variation in punitiveness 
across Western societies in terms of preference for prison for a recidivist burglar. Instead, 
it is those individuals who are living in more religiously heterogeneous societies and 
where belief in hell is more prominent that have the highest odds of preferring a prison 
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sentence for a recidivist burglar. These factors are above and beyond the roles 
demographic or perceptions of crime, law and order play in determining attitudes toward 
punishment. 
Table 14a.  Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Preference for Prison 
(Odds Ratios) [Extension of Model 12, Ch.4] 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5a 
County-Level Variables 
Odds  
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Objective Reality of Crime             
Homicide Rate 1.582 * (.174)          
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime             
Law and Order as a Political Issue    1.003 * (.182)       
Public Perception of Police Ineffectiveness    0.989  (.001)       
Conservative Climate             
Political Conservatism       1.027  (.022)    
Conservative Religious Belief       1.046  (.045)    
Belief in Hell          1.027 ** (.009) 
Belief in Absolute Standards  
   of Good and Evil             
Belief in Sin             
Church Attendance             
Population Diversity             
Ethnic Heterogeneity             
Religious Heterogeneity             
Income Inequality              
Individual-Level Variables             
Demographics              
Male 1.408 *** (.031) 1.408 *** (.031) 1.332  (.155) 1.408 *** (.028) 
Education 0.930 *** (.005) 0.930 *** (.005) 0.941  (.033) 0.930 *** (.005) 
Age 16 – 19 1.311 ** (.087) 1.311 ** (.087) 1.252  (.145) 1.310 ** (.083) 
Age 20 – 24 1.394 *** (.078) 1.394 *** (.078) 1.321  (.164) 1.393 *** (.071) 
Age 25 – 29 1.510 *** (.063) 1.509 *** (.063) 1.408  (.190) 1.509 *** (.060) 
Age 30 – 34 1.382 *** (.060) 1.382 *** (.060) 1.309  (.153) 1.382 *** (.057) 
Age 35 – 39 1.354 *** (.059) 1.353 *** (.059) 1.285  (.144) 1.354 *** (.057) 
Age 40 – 44 1.106  (.063) 1.106  (.063) 1.085  (.073) 1.106  (.060) 
Age 50 – 54 0.946  (.062) 0.945  (.062) 0.953  (.060) 0.946  (.060) 
Age 55 – 59 1.039  (.066) 1.039  (.066) 1.030  (.062) 1.039  (.063) 
Age 60 – 64 1.024  (.072) 1.024  (.072) 1.018  (.065) 1.024  (.068) 
Age 65 – 70 1.141  (.078) 1.141  (.078) 1.111  (.091) 1.141  (.073) 
Age 71 + 1.126  (.065) 1.126  (.065) 1.101  (.079) 1.126  (.062) 
Income (Above Median) 0.889 *** (.032) 0.889 *** (.032) 0.906  (.061) 0.889 *** (.030) 
Married 1.078 * (.031) 1.078 * (.031) 1.065  (.044) 1.077 * (.030) 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order             
Perceived Risk of Burglary 1.125 *** (.025) 1.125 *** (.025) 1.106  (.058) 1.125 *** (.023) 
Victim of Violent Crime 1.128 ** (.040) 1.128 ** (.040) 1.105  (.064) 1.128 ** (.039) 
Victim of Nonviolent Crime 0.951  (.028) 0.951  (.028) 0.958  (.034) 0.951  (.028) 
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness 1.166 *** (.041) 1.166 *** (.041) 1.137  (.079) 1.165 *** (.041) 
             
Intercept (coefficient) -1.191 *** (.189) -1.888 *** (.550) -.989   -1.190 *** (.182) 
             
Country-Level Variance 0.612 ***  .557 ***  .471 ***  .564 ***  
Percent of Variance Explained 15.00%   22.60%   ---   21.67%   
             
p ≤ .05 *p ≤ .01 **p ≤ .001***             
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Table 14b:  Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Preference for Prison – 
Continued (Odds Ratios)[Extension of Model 12, Ch.4] 
 Model 5b Model 5c Model 5d Model 6 
County-Level Variables 
Odds  
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Objective Reality of Crime             
Homicide Rate             
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime             
Law and Order as a Political Issue             
Public Perception of Police Ineffectiveness             
Conservative Climate             
Political Conservatism             
Conservative Religious Belief             
Belief in Hell             
Belief in Absolute Standards  
    of Good and Evil 1.045 * (.016)          
Belief in Sin    1.019  (.010)       
Church Attendance       1.016  (.013)    
Population Diversity             
Ethnic Heterogeneity          0.566  (.855) 
Religious Heterogeneity          8.136 ** (.711) 
Income Inequality           1.070  (.039) 
Individual-Level Variables  
           
Demographics              
Male 1.408 *** (.031) 1.408 *** (.031) 1.408 *** (.031) 1.408 *** (.031) 
Education 0.930 *** (.005) 0.930 *** (.005) 0.930 *** (.005) 0.930 *** (.005) 
Age 16 – 19 1.310 ** (.087) 1.311 ** (.087) 1.311 ** (.087) 1.311 ** (.087) 
Age 20 – 24 1.393 *** (.078) 1.394 *** (.078) 1.394 *** (.078) 1.393 *** (.078) 
Age 25 – 29 1.509 *** (.063) 1.509 *** (.063) 1.509 *** (.063) 1.509 *** (.063) 
Age 30 – 34 1.382 *** (.060) 1.382 *** (.060) 1.382 *** (.060) 1.382 *** (.060) 
Age 35 – 39 1.353 *** (.059) 1.353 *** (.059) 1.353 *** (.058) 1.353 *** (.059) 
Age 40 – 44 1.106  (.063) 1.106  (.063) 1.106  (.063) 1.106  (.063) 
Age 50 – 54 0.946  (.062) 0.945  (.062) 0.946  (.062) 0.946  (.062) 
Age 55 – 59 1.039  (.066) 1.039  (.066) 1.039  (.066) 1.039  (.066) 
Age 60 – 64 1.024  (.072) 1.024  (.072) 1.024  (.072) 1.024  (.072) 
Age 65 – 70 1.141  (.078) 1.141  (.078) 1.141  (.078) 1.141  (.078) 
Age 71 + 1.126  (.065) 1.126  (.065) 1.126  (.065) 1.126  (.065) 
Income (Above Median) 0.889 *** (.032) 0.889  (.032) 0.889 *** (.032) 0.888 *** (.032) 
Married 1.078 * (.031) 1.078  (.031) 1.078 * (.031) 1.076 * (.031) 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order             
Perceived Risk of Burglary 1.125 *** (.025) 1.125 *** (.025) 1.125 *** (.025) 1.125 *** (.025) 
Victim of Violent Crime 1.128 ** (.040) 1.128 ** (.040) 1.128 ** (.040) 1.128 ** (.040) 
Victim of Nonviolent Crime 0.951  (.028) 0.951  (.028) 0.951  (.034) 0.951  (.028) 
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness 1.165 *** (.041) 1.166 *** (.041) 1.165 *** (.041) 1.166 *** (.041) 
             








             
Country-Level Variance 0.594 ***  .713 ***  .798 ***  .485 ***  
Percent of Variance Explained 17.50%   ---   ---   32.64%   
  
           





Table 14c. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Preference for Prison – 
Continued (Odds Ratios)[Extension of Model 12, Ch.4] 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
County-Level Variables 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
 Ratio  SE 
Odds 
 Ratio  SE 
Objective Reality of Crime             
Homicide Rate       1.313  (.174) 1.181  (.252) 
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime             
Law and Order as a Political Issue    1.002 * (.001)    1.002  (.002) 
Public Perception of Police Ineffectiveness             
Conservative Climate             
Political Conservatism             
Conservative Religious Belief             
Belief in Hell 1.019 * (.008)          
Belief in Absolute Standards  
    of Good and Evil             
Belief in Sin             
Church Attendance             
Population Diversity             
Ethnic Heterogeneity             
Religious Heterogeneity 5.371 * (.653) 4.822 * (.691) 5.500 * (.728)    
Income Inequality              
Individual-Level Variables             
Demographics             
Male 1.332 *** (.031) 1.408 *** (.031) 1.408 *** (.031) 1.408 *** (.031) 
Education 0.941 *** (.005) 0.930 *** (.005) 0.930 *** (.005) 0.930 *** (.005) 
Age 16 – 19 1.252 ** (.087) 1.311 ** (.087) 1.311 ** (.087) 1.311 ** (.087) 
Age 20 – 24 1.321 *** (.078) 1.394 *** (.078) 1.394 *** (.078) 1.394 *** (.078) 
Age 25 – 29 1.408 *** (.063) 1.509 *** (.063) 1.510 *** (.063) 1.510 *** (.063) 
Age 30 – 34 1.309 *** (.060) 1.382 *** (.060) 1.382 *** (.060) 1.382 *** (.060) 
Age 35 – 39 1.285 *** (.059) 1.353 *** (.059) 1.353 *** (.059) 1.353 *** (.059) 
Age 40 – 44 1.085  (.063) 1.106  (.063) 1.106  (.063) 1.106  (.063) 
Age 50 – 54 0.953  (.062) 0.945  (.062) 0.945  (.062) 0.945  (.062) 
Age 55 – 59 1.030  (.066) 1.039  (.066) 1.039  (.066) 1.039  (.066) 
Age 60 – 64 1.018  (.072) 1.024  (.072) 1.024  (.072) 1.024  (.072) 
Age 65 – 70 1.111  (.078) 1.141  (.078) 1.141  (.078) 1.141  (.078) 
Age 71 + 1.101  (.065) 1.126  (.065) 1.126  (.065) 1.126  (.065) 
Income (Above Median) 0.906  (.032) 0.889 *** (.032) 0.889 *** (.032) 0.889 *** (.032) 
Married 1.065  (.031) 1.078 * (.031) 1.078 * (.031) 1.078 * (.031) 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order             
Perceived Risk of Burglary 1.106 *** (.025) 1.125 *** (.025) 1.125 *** (.025) 1.125 *** (.025) 
Victim of Violent Crime 1.105 ** (.040) 1.128 ** (.040) 1.128 ** (.040) 1.128 ** (.040) 
Victim of Nonviolent Crime 0.958  (.028) 0.951  (.028) 0.951  (.028) 0.951  (.028) 
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness 1.137 *** (.041) 1.166 *** (.041) 1.166 *** (.041) 1.166 *** (.041) 
             
Intercept (coefficient) -1.192 *** (.159) -1.192 *** (.162) -1.193 *** (.169) -1.191 *** (.182) 
             
Country-Level Variance .420   .434 ***  0.480 ***  0.565 ***  
Percent of Variance Explained 41.67%   39.72%   33.33%   21.53%   
             
p ≤ .05 *p ≤ .01 **p ≤ .001***             









Finally, a model was estimated (not shown) with the next logical set of country-
level variables included in the model: religious heterogeneity, belief in hell, law and 
order as a political issue. Due to the high correlations between belief in hell and law and 
order as a political issue (r=.67) and the small sample size of countries nothing remained 
significant. The next chapter tests the same multi-level model of punitiveness with data 



































Chapter 6:  Testing the Multi-Level Model of Punitiveness on Death 
Penalty Attitudes 
This chapter reports the results of a full test of the multi-level model of 
punitiveness presented in Chapter 2 using the VPMS data. This chapter is an extension of 
the analyses started in Chapter 4 with VPMS data (Table 13). Chapter 4, Table 13 is 
dedicated to testing the individual-level aspects of the multi-level model of punitiveness 
presented in Chapter 2. This chapter adds to those results with an investigation of the role 
that social context plays in shaping individual support for the death penalty. 
Specifically, this chapter is focused on uncovering the expected relationships 
between each of the following types of contextual-level factors and punitiveness 
measured as support for the death penalty: (1) objective reality of crime (2) socially 
constructed realities of crime (3) conservative climate (4) population diversity. For a 
quick review of the hypotheses concerning the relationship between the social context 
and attitudes toward the death penalty the following is a list of expected relationships 
between the social context at the country level and attitudes toward the death penalty. It is 
expected that individuals who live in countries with higher homicide rates; individuals 
who live in countries where law and order is a significant political issue; individuals who 
live in countries where public perceptions of police ineffectiveness are high; individuals 
who live in countries with higher levels of political conservatism; individuals who live in 
countries where conservative religious belief is more common; individuals who live in 
countries that are ethnically diverse; individuals who live in countries that are religiously 
diverse and individuals who live in countries with higher levels of income inequality will 
be more punitive and therefore support the use of the death penalty. 
The results of hierarchical logistic regression analyses used to test these 
hypotheses are displayed in Table 15. As predicted, model 3 of Table 15 reveals a 
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significant relationship between the objective reality of crime and individual punitiveness 
indicating that individuals who live in countries with higher homicide rates have higher 
odds of being in favor of the death penalty. Further, homicide rate explains 77.87% of the 
variation attitudes toward the death penalty across Western societies. 
Model 4, Table 15 shows a significant relationship between socially constructed 
realities of crime and individual punitiveness. Law and order as a political issue is 
positively and significantly related to punitiveness. This indicates that individuals who 
live in countries with more exposure to law and order messages have significantly higher 
odds of favoring the death penalty compared to individuals living in countries where law 
and order messages are less prominent. Law and order as a political issue explains 
62.18% variation in support for the death penalty across Western societies. 
Model 5, Table 15 reveals mixed support for a significant relationship between 
conservative climate and punitiveness in that a climate of conservative religious belief is 
positively related to support for the death penalty. This finding takes into account any 
relationship between country-level political conservatism and support for the death 
penalty which is not a significant predictor of the death penalty once conservative 
religious belief is considered. Political conservatism at the country-level was initially 
found to be a positive and significant predictor of support for the death penalty (model 
not shown) before conservative religious belief at the country-level was taken into 
account. While countries with higher levels of political conservatism tend to also be 
countries with higher levels of conservative religious belief (r=.48), it is the context of 
conservative religious belief that is directly related to support for the death penalty. 
Model 5a reveals that the relationship between country-level conservative religious belief 
remains after taking church attendance into account. Unlike the results from the ICVS 
data, church attendance was significantly and positively related to support for the death 
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penalty but this relationship did not hold up once country-level conservative religious 
belief was also considered. Again, countries with higher levels of church attendance tend 
be countries where conservative religious belief is more prevalent (r = .87***), but it is 
the context of conservative religious belief that is significantly related to support for the 
death penalty. 
Model 6, Table 15 considers the relationship between population diversity and 
support for the death penalty. The types of population diversity tested as potential 
predictors of death penalty attitudes include: ethnic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity 
and income inequality. The results reveal that only religious heterogeneity is positively 
and significantly related to support for the death penalty. Individuals who live in more 
religiously heterogeneous societies have significantly higher odds of being in favor of the 
death penalty than individuals who live in more religiously homogeneous societies. Net 
of individual factors and taking into account any relationships between ethnic 
heterogeneity and punitiveness and income inequality and punitiveness, religious 
heterogeneity explains 58.4% of the variation in punitiveness across Western societies in 
terms of punishment preferences for a second conviction of burglary. 
To summarize, the analyses thus far indicate that homicide rate, law and order as 
a political issue, country-level conservative religious belief, and religious heterogeneity 
are all positively related to attitudes toward the death penalty when considered separately. 
Analyses now turn to comparing country-level predicators in their ability to explain 
variance across Western societies in support for capital punishment. Model 7, Table 15 
investigates the comparative explanatory power of country-level conservative religious 
belief and law and order as a political issue on death penalty attitudes. Only homicide rate 
remains a statistically significant and positive predictor of support for death penalty. 
Likewise, models 8 and 9 in Table 15 reveal homicide rate to be the only significant and 
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positive country-level predictor of support for the death penalty when considered 
alongside conservative religious belief (model 8) and religious heterogeneity (model 9). 
The next and final chapter summarizes and discusses the findings just reported in 
Chapters 4 through 6. 
Table 15a. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Support for the Death 
Penalty (Odds Ratios)[Extension of Model 13, Ch.4] 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5a 
County-Level Variables 
Odds  
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Objective Reality of Crime             
Homicide Rate 1.582 * (.174)          
Socially Constructed Realities  
    of Crime             
Law and Order as a Political Issue    1.005 * (.001)       
Conservative Climate             
Political Conservatism       1.012  (.013)    
Conservative Religious Belief       1.132 *** (.029) 1.193 * (.075) 
Church Attendance          .988  (.023) 
Population Diversity             
Ethnic Heterogeneity             
Religious Heterogeneity             
Income Inequality              
Individual-Level Variables             
Demographics             
Male 1.371 *** (.043) 1.371 *** (.043) 1.371 *** (.043) 1.371 *** (.043) 
Education 0.870 *** (.029) 0.870 *** (.029) 0.871 *** (.029) 0.872 *** (.029) 
Age Under 18 1.036  (.087) 1.023  (.119) 1.027  (.119) 1.024  (.119) 
Age 18 – 24 1.141  (.074) 1.138  (.074) 1.139  (.074) 1.138  (.074) 
Age 25 – 34 1.166 * (.068) 1.166 * (.068) 1.165 * (.068) 1.165 * (.068) 
Age 35 – 44 1.080  (.065) 1.080  (.065) 1.080  (.065) 1.080  (.065) 
Age 55 – 64 1.003  (.071) 1.001  (.071) 1.002  (.071) 1.001  (.071) 
Age 65+ 0.984  (.067) 0.985  (.068) .986  (.067) .987  (.067) 
Married 1.402 *** (.056) 1.401 *** (.056) 1.402 *** (.056) 1.402 *** (.056) 
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order             
Crime Concern 1.358 *** (.031) 1.357 *** (.030) 1.360 *** (.030) 1.359 *** (.030) 
Conservative Religious Belief  








Personal God 1.243 * (.087) 1.243 * (.087) 1.243 * (.087) 1.242 * (.087) 
Spirit or Life Force 1.079  (.077) 1.077  (.077) 1.080  (.077) 1.079  (.077) 
Don’t Know What to Think  




Religiosity .949 *** (.006) .949 *** (.006) 0.949 *** (.006) 0.949 *** (.006) 
Catholic .837 *** (.048) .838 *** (.046) 0.831 *** (.046) 0.832 *** (.046) 
             
Intercept (coefficient) -1.033 *** (.149) -1.149 *** (.202) -1.125 *** (.190) -1.198 *** (.189) 
             
Country-Level Variance 0.158 ***  0.270 ***  .284 ***  .295 ***  
Percent of Variance Explained 77.87%   62.18%   60.22%   58.68%   
             





Table 15b. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Preference for Prison – 
Continued (Odds Ratios)[Extension of Model 13, Ch.4] 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
County-Level Variables 
Odds  
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Odds 
Ratio  SE 
Objective Reality of Crime             
Homicide Rate    1.388 ** (.098) 1.375 ** (.099) 1.389 ** (.086) 
Socially Constructed Realities  
    of Crime             
Law and Order as a Political Issue    1.001  (.001)       
Conservative Climate             
Political Conservatism             
Conservative Religious Belief       1.037  (.038)    
Church Attendance             
Population Diversity             
Ethnic Heterogeneity 1.087  (.859)          
Religious Heterogeneity 11.653 * (.873)       2.003  (.799) 
Income Inequality  1.062  (.056)          
Individual-Level Variables             
Demographics             
Male 1.372 
**
* (.043) 1.371 
**
* (.043) 1.370 
**





* (.023) 0.869 
**
* (.029) 0.870 
**
* (.029) 0.870 
**
* (.029) 
Age Under 18 1.023  (.119) 1.034  (.118) 1.035  (.118) 1.034  (.118) 
Age 18 – 24 1.138  (.074) 1.140  (.074) 1.140  (.074) 1.140  (.074) 
Age 25 – 34 1.166 * (.068) 1.166 * (.068) 1.166 * (.068) 1.166 * (.068) 
Age 35 – 44 1.080  (.065) 1.080  (.065) 1.080  (.065) 1.080  (.065) 
Age 55 – 64 1.001  (.071) 1.003  (.071) 1.003  (.070) 1.003  (.071) 

















Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order             
















Conservative Religious Belief  








Personal God 1.246 * (.087) 1.242 * (.087) 1.241 * (.087) 1.243 * (.087) 
Spirit or Life Force 1.080  (.077) 1.078  (.077) 1.078  (.077) 1.078  (.077) 
Don’t Know What to Think  








































             
































  78.85%   78.29%   
             





Chapter 7:  Conclusion and Discussion 
This dissertation research expands the criminological and sociological literature 
on punitiveness by developing and testing a multi-level model of punitiveness designed 
to apply across Western societies. This model was tested on data from two multi-national 
datasets, each with a unique measure of punitiveness. The individual-level model within 
the multi-level model of punitiveness faired considerably well for both measures of 
punitiveness: (1) punishment preferences for a second burglary conviction and (2) 
support for the death penalty. The demographics, personal beliefs and perceptions, and 
personal experiences commonly found to be associated with punitiveness or hypothesized 
to influence punitiveness within the U.S. were also found to be associated with 
punitiveness across Western societies in similar ways.  
Hierarchical logistic regression models revealed that males residing in Western 
societies and married individuals residing in Western societies tend to favor of prison for 
a recidivist burglar and are more supportive of the death penalty than women. Those with 
more education were found to be less in favor of prison for a recidivist burglar as well as 
less in favor of the death penalty. Age and income did not operate as expected across 
Western societies. Younger individuals were found to be more in favor of a prison 
sentence for a recidivist burglar than older individuals and some younger individuals 
(those ages 25 to 34) indicated more support for the death penalty. Those with incomes 
above the median tended to be less in favor of prison for a recidivist burglar compared to 
those with incomes below the median. However, the relationship between age and 
punitiveness is not consistent in the previous literature on punitiveness. Further, the 
measure for income from the ICVS was less than ideal in only distinguishing between 
incomes that fall above and below the median. If income had been measured in a 
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standardized way and/or as a continuous variable a positive relationship between income 
and punitiveness may have been detected. 
In addition, results showed that those who perceive their risk of victimization to 
be high or who are personally concerned about crime tend to be more in favor of prison 
for a recidivist burglar and more supportive of the death penalty while individuals who 
hold negative evaluations of the police and individuals who are prior victims of violent 
crime are also more in favor of prison for a repeat burglar. Finally, results revealed that 
individuals who believe in a personal God tend to be more in favor of the death penalty 
compared to individuals with no belief in God while individuals who identify as Catholic 
and individuals who have higher levels of religiosity are less supportive of the death 
penalty.  
The finding that individuals who have been victims of violent crime tend to be 
more punitive is especially noteworthy because the punitiveness literature is full of 
studies where researchers predict a positive relationship between prior criminal 
victimization and punitiveness for instrumental reasons but results generate a null 
finding. This is likely because the operationalization of prior criminal victimization in 
previous research has not distinguished between violent and non-violent victimization. 
This research underscores the importance of measuring prior victimization more precisely 
in future research on punitiveness. 
Beyond exploring individual-level influences on attitudes towards punishment in 
Western societies, this research powerfully illustrates the strong variation in public 
punitiveness that exists across Western countries and considers how differences in the 
national social context can influence individual attitudes toward criminal punishment. 
Public support for prison as an appropriate punishment for a recidivist burglar ranges 
from 10.5% in Austria to 64% in the U.S. and support for the death penalty ranges from 
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13.4% in Iceland to 68% in the U.S. This dissertation considered how the objective 
reality of crime, socially constructed realities of crime, conservative climate and 
population diversity may help explain the variation across Western countries in attitudes 
toward criminal punishment.  
While controlling for compositional effects and individual-level influences on 
attitudes toward criminal punishment, which alone were not helpful in explaining 
variation in punitiveness across Westerns societies, hierarchical logistic regression 
models revealed that the two indicators of punitiveness, punishment preference for a 
recidivist burglar and support for the death penalty, varied as to which aspects of the 
social context were most helpful in explaining their variation across Western societies. 
Four aspects of the social context were considered as potential predictors of individual-
level punitiveness: (1) objective realities of crime (2) socially constructed realities of 
crime (3) conservative climate and (4) population diversity.  
Variation across Western societies in support for prison for a recidivist burglar is 
best explained by religious heterogeneity and belief in hell at the country level. A series 
of hierarchical logistic regression models revealed these two aspects of the social context 
to remain significant when considered together as potential influences on individual 
attitudes toward criminal punishment in Western societies. Both religious heterogeneity 
and belief in hell at the country level have a positive and significant relationship with 
individual punitiveness. Further, religious heterogeneity and country-level belief in a 
literal hell account for 42% of the variation in preference for prison for a second burglary 
conviction that is observed across Western societies with the ICVS data. These findings 
suggest that individuals who live in Western societies that are more religiously 
heterogeneous and individuals who live in Western societies with a higher proportion of 
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the population that believes in hell are more likely to favor prison as an appropriate 
punishment for a recidivist burglar. 
The increased levels of in-group interaction between people of different religious 
backgrounds associated with higher levels of religious heterogeneity be it direct 
interaction such as day-to-day public encounters or indirect interaction from elites and the 
media may breed anxiety and mistrust due to a perceived moral inferiority of religious 
groups to which one does not belong or relate to. This may ultimately lead to preferences 
for increased punishment for criminal behavior that can be construed as demonstrated 
acts of immorality.  
Also the proportion of the population that believes in hell may indicate the degree 
to which a culture subscribes to notions of retribution. Not all conservative religious 
beliefs considered in this research were found to be positively and significantly related to 
preference for prison for a recidivist burglar. Beliefs in absolute standards of good and 
evil and sin do not directly invoke ideas of punishment as an end in itself. These beliefs 
acknowledge the existence of evil and wrongdoing but do not indicate a specific response 
or punishment for evil behavior, sin or wrongdoing whereas a literal hell by its very 
definition is an eternal punishment for varying degrees of wrongdoing. Individuals that 
live in societies where belief in a literal hell is more common may be more likely to 
punish criminals more harshly whether they are burglars or murderers simply because 
they believe these criminals simply deserve it. 
By contrast, variation in support for the death penalty across Western societies is 
best explained by the homicide rate and homicide rate accounts for over 75% of the 
variation in capital punishment attitudes across Western societies. While law and order as 
a political issue, religious heterogeneity and conservative religious belief were initially 
each positively and significantly related to support for the death penalty, all of these 
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relationships became statistically insignificant once they were considered in the same 
model with homicide rate. 
Since the odds ratio for homicide rate decreases (see Table 15, Chapter 6) when 
each of the above country-level factors were considered alongside homicide rate, 
homicide rate may partially mediate the relationship between religious heterogeneity and 
punitiveness as well as mediate the relationship between conservative religious belief and 
punitiveness. These mediations may be very partial as the reduction in the coefficient of 
homicide rate is quite modest. Countries with higher levels of religious heterogeneity 
may have higher homicide rates which leads to more punitiveness due either to the 
normality of conflict and violent between religious groups or due to instrumental 
concerns and wanting to reduce the prospect of future criminal victimization.  
More plausibly, based on work by Jensen (2006) and a slightly larger reduction in 
the odds ratio for homicide rate when conservative religious belief is considered 
alongside homicide rate in a model predicting support for the death penalty, homicide 
rate may mediate the relationship between country levels of conservative religious belief 
and punitiveness. Jensen (2006) argues that countries with higher levels of conservative 
religious belief such as a cosmic duality between good and evil where God and the Devil 
are constantly in conflict with each other are also countries with more interpersonal 
conflict which is likely to lead to more instances of confrontation with that an increased 
potential of being resolved with interpersonal violence. In societies where resolving 
conflict with violence is more the norm than the exception are likely to be more 
comfortable with criminal punishments involving physical violence including the death 
penalty. 
Baumer et al. (2003) in their multi-level analysis of support for the death penalty 
in the U.S. that focused on the influence of neighborhood context on the support for the 
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death penalty found that controlling for compositional effects, individuals living in 
neighborhoods that were more politically conservative, had a larger black population and 
higher homicide rate were significantly more in favor of the death penalty. Social 
contextual influences of political conservatism and population diversity at the national 
level were considered as potential predictors of individual support for the death penalty 
across Western societies based on the Baumer et al. (2003) study but the latter two 
findings of the Baumer et al. (2003) did not translate well when applied to Western 
societies even after seemingly translatable measures were utilized (ethnic heterogeneity 
for racial threat and percent voting conservative for political conservatism). Perhaps this 
is not too surprising. 
The U.S. has a very unique history of race relations that cannot realistically be 
compared to the race relations of other Western societies. The U.S. also has a very unique 
two-party political system unlike any other Western political system that most likely 
yields a U.S.-specific version of political conservatism not easily applied to other 
Western societies. However, homicide rate is comparable across Western societies. There 
may be differences among Western countries to the extent to which the positive 
relationship between country-level homicide rate and punitiveness is due to the degree of 
normality of violence or instrumental concerns about violent crime and desire to prevent 
further violent crime. Both explanations are likely to apply perhaps in varying degrees to 
all Western societies.  
Future research should continue to identify contextual-level factors that may 
explain country-level differences in public punitiveness in Western society with an eye to 
factors that are universal to Western societies. The U.S. may complicate cross-national 
comparisons with other Western countries and researchers should remain cognizant of 
this in future research in this area. One avenue for future research on cross-national 
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differences in punitiveness is to compare how crime is treated in the media across 
Western societies and examine how its portrayal may influence individual attitudes 
toward punishment. Unnever and Cullen (2009) are likely on a right track by focusing on 
stereotypical images of offenders as a powerful influence on individual attitudes toward 
punishment. Future research should examine how those stereotypical images are 
developed and disseminated by the media and find a way to measure this cross-nationally 
to determine how these images influence punitiveness. This is one challenging possibility 
for furthering our understanding of cross-national variation in public punitiveness.  
It may also be fruitful to investigate how influential direct measures of media 
focus on crime may be related to individual attitudes toward punishment. One way this 
could be done is through an on-line news database like Lexis-Nexus were national news 
media sources for the appropriate country and time period can be downloaded and subject 
to content analysis. One obstacle to this research is language. Ideally, a multicultural 
team of researchers would analyze news sources in their native language in order to get 
the full context of cultural messages about crime and punishment. 
One crude way of measuring crime in the media through Lexis-Nexis in the 
absence of a multicultural team of researchers is to translate the word “crime” into 
multiple languages associated with the countries of interest. Then “crime” can be 
searched to obtain counts for the number of new stories for which “crime” is mentioned 
by each newspaper per day, week, or month or time period identified as most appropriate. 
Much of the context of these stories would be lost but general measures of the degree to 
which crime is mentioned and given attention in the media could be generated. It would 
be interesting to see if such a crude measure would produce significant variation across 
countries and whether it could help explain variation in attitudes towards punishment 
across countries. It is possible that a crude measure of attention to crime and punishment 
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in the media is significantly correlated to the country-level measure of crime as a political 
issue used in this study. This is should be explored by future research. 
Future research on punitiveness should incorporate the novelties of the current 
research while also addressing its limitations. This research has established the 
importance of religion as both a protective factor and risk factor for generating punitive 
attitudes at both the individual-level and contextual-level. Conservative religious belief at 
the country-level and the way religion is socially constructed in society has been shown 
to at least indirectly influence, if not directly influence attitudes toward punishment. Both 
conservative religious belief at the country-level and religious population heterogeneity 
were found to significantly and positively influence one if not the other measure of 
punitive attitudes in this study. Individual-level religiosity is found to be negatively 
related to support for the death penalty while individual-level conservative religious 
belief were found to be positively related to support for the death penalty.  
Future research on attitudes toward criminal punishment should considering both 
the individual and contextual influences and consider religion’s role in shaping attitudes 
toward punishment whenever possible. A standardized cross-national measure of political 
conservatism should be developed. Political conservatism as it exists in the US may not 
exist outside of the U.S. but a cross-national measure of political conservatism should 
still be explored in future study designs. Some of the more puzzling results (e.g. political 
conservatism at the country-level not explaining cross-national variation in punitiveness, 
but explaining away previously significant relationships between individual-level 
predictors and punitiveness) from this research may have been due to the fact that 
political conservatism nor religiosity could not be taken into account in the multi-level 
model of punitiveness on punishment preferences for a recidivist burglar due to 
limitations in the data 
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One limitation of studying variation in punitiveness among Western societies 
empirically is that there are only so many Western countries and thus the sample size will 
always small. Ideally future research would find a way to overcome this limitation. 
Eventually when country-level data quality permits, non-Western countries should be 
considered in cross-national studies of public punitiveness.  
This dissertation tested several explanations of variation in punitiveness already 
presented in the literature but the model of punitiveness developed in this dissertation did 
not represent a theory but instead was a tested of what previous research has indicated 
should be significantly related to punitiveness and also delved into uncharted territory 
with the consideration of religious heterogeneity and conservative religious belief at the 
country-level, however, more theory needs to be developed in this area. Unnever and 
Cullen (2009) are pioneers in theorizing punitiveness but much more work needs to be 
done. This research has confirmed that the social context matters in influencing attitudes 
toward criminal punishment. This raises the possibility of cross-level interactions 
between individual and country-level predictors of punitiveness. However, without any 
truly testable theory of public punitiveness available, there is little justification for 
exploring cross-level interactions between country and individual-level factors in 
predicting punitiveness at this time.  
Overall, this research greatly enhances our understanding of the individual and 
social contextual influences on punitiveness and illustrates how social context can have 
varying influence on attitudes toward punishment based on the indicator of punitiveness 
being studied. But to reiterate, the multi-level model of punitiveness developed for and 
tested in this dissertation and to be applied to Western societies is not a full or exhaustive 
model. Plenty of variation across Western societies in punitiveness remains to be 
explained even after controlling for individual-level or compositional influences and 
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considering the contextual factors such as objective reality of crime, socially constructed 
realities of crime, conservative climate and population diversity. Ultimately, this 
dissertation research provides a stepping off place for looking at an endless number of 
country-level contextual effects on individual attitudes toward punishment and other 
individual-level attitudes related to criminology. This avenue of research is only limited 
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